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Abstract
Medical record sharing across healthcare organisations is fundamental for improving quality
of care and reducing assistance costs. However, healthcare organisations are still struggling in
building cross-organisation data sharing solutions due to strict data protection regulations that
varies across states and regions, availability of a variety of technical standards for medical
record sharing, and differences among organisations’ IT infrastructures that have been built
over the years to satisfy organisations’ specific needs and requirements.
This thesis reports our findings based on various research and industrial projects aiming at
connecting healthcare organisations. The primary contributions of this dissertation are:
• A methodology and an execution environment to define and execute cross- organisa-
tion data sharing processes in compliance with both data protection regulations and
organisations’ requirements. The methodology consists of multiple steps that start with
the extraction of compliance requirements from regulations and gathering of business re-
quirements from the involved stakeholders, and end with the definition of data sharing
processes and policies to satisfy the collected requirements. The modelling framework
that supports the methodology provides to users the modelling tools and guidelines to de-
fine the business processes and policies for sharing privacy-sensitive data. The execution
framework maps the business processes into actionable operations to manage privacy-
sensitive data and data protection policies.
• An event-driven service integration approach to support cross-organisation data
sharing. The integration approach focuses on identifying data dependencies among insti-
tutions (i.e., data they produce, consume and would like to exchange) in form of events
rather than analysing internal data structures. To support this approach, we propose a
privacy-aware event-driven data-sharing protocol and a system architecture based on com-
bination of Service Oriented (SOA) and Event Driven (EDA) architectural patterns. The
data-sharing protocol and the underlying fine-grained access control policies provide con-
trol on the access and dissemination of sensitive information among the involved organi-
sations.
• A set of algorithms to detect and to prevent access control policy violations in data
integration caused by the presence of functional dependencies. In data integration
typically each source specifies its local access control policies and cannot anticipate the
functional dependencies among sets of attributes (or any other type of data inference) that
can arise when data is integrated. Functional dependencies can allow malicious users
to obtain prohibited information by linking multiple queries and thus violating the local
policies. To solve such issues, we propose algorithms to identify the sets of queries that
can lead to such privacy violations. We then propose algorithms to identify additional
policies that are able to prevent the identified queries from completion and thus prevent
policy violations.
We show how the proposed solutions have been applied in practice in building Electronic
Health Record and Business Intelligence systems that involve cross-organisation sharing of
privacy-sensitive data. The thesis reports also the validations of the proposed technologies
with end-users and privacy experts, and the lessons learned after deploying an instance of the
developed system in a multi-organisation scenario in Trentino, Italy.
Keywords
Electronic Health Records, regulatory compliance, cross-organization data sharing, business
process modelling and execution, data sharing protocols, access control policies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Interoperable Electronic Health Record (EHR) systems can improve quality of care, reduce
assistance costs and timely share data for clinical research and business intelligence over cross-
organisation assistance processes [89, 145, 166]. Due to these benefits, the development of EHR
systems has been identified as one of the strategic initiatives by many governments [67, 123,
174]. Although these initiatives have resulted into the development of different projects with
promising outcomes [36, 67, 133, 136, 143], the current level of EHR adoption is still partial
and evolves slowly [63].
Although the reasons for such partial success are multiple and involve for example human
factors (e.g. resistance to change) and economical motivations (e.g. impact on existing IT
systems), the technological issues have still a big impact [63, 145]. Therefore, a question that
can arise is:
“Why is data sharing in healthcare more challenging from technological point of view than
in other sectors like airline or banking? Why interoperability related challenges in airline and
banking have been solved many years ago?"
The answer to this question sits in the complexity of the healthcare sector, which requires
ad-hoc approaches and technologies for each integration scenario. While working on industrial
and research projects in healthcare, we were faced with such complexity and observed that de-
veloping the technology to support medical record sharing involves challenges in the following
aspects:
• legal aspects due to highly privacy-sensitive data content, different purposes of use of
data, and strict data protection regulations defined at different levels. Due to the impor-
tance of privacy in healthcare, those regulations are defined also exclusively for med-
ical record sharing [94] to identify data owners and entities responsible for managing
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and sharing data. Unlike banking data that contains only financial information, medical
records contain much border personal information that includes patients’ health, social
and financial status. Therefore in healthcare, it is challenging to extract policies from
regulations (usually requiring the involvement of actors having appropriate background
and expertise), identify appropriate software development methodology to achieve com-
pliance while sharing data, and prove to Privacy Guarantors, Compliance Officers and
people with little technical background, that the developed solutions are compliant with
regulations and policies.
• technical aspects due to existence of a variety of competing standards to deal with data
semantics [20, 60, 161, 170], data sharing protocols [93, 140, 169] and system architec-
tures [93, 143, 133, 169]. Furthermore, these standards are still evolving and there are
still ongoing research efforts in identifying even more sophisticated solutions for the cre-
ation of interoperable EHR systems [87]. Therefore, for an organisation to join the EHR
programs can be challenging and costly, since the organization would need to adapt its en-
vironment to these new standards. This obstacle becomes much more relevant for smaller
institutions having less expertise and availability of resources.
• organizational aspects due to the intrinsic complexity of the healthcare assistance ser-
vices which are delivered jointly by both public and private institutions of different sizes
(e.g., large hospitals and small clinic offices) and focused on providing specific aids such
as hospitalization, social assistance or assistance at home. By their nature, these services
rely heavily on knowledge and experience of single caregivers. To satisfy their needs,
institutions have developed over the years different IT systems specifically tight to best
practices and based on how they have interpreted regulatory policies. To ensure their par-
ticipation to EHR programs, and at the same time to preserve their working practices and
existing information systems, there is the need to develop data sharing solutions that are
as less intrusive as possible. As a consequence, it is difficult to develop a “one size fits
all” solution.
These aspects and related challenges affect any research or industrial project that aims at
developing solutions to enable cross-organisational data sharing in healthcare. For each project
they can have different importance and impact on the resulting technology and their combina-
tion makes the development of data sharing in healthcare an extremely challenging task.
In the following sections, we report three research threads that span across these three as-
pects. For each of them we report the research challenges, our approach toward the solutions,
the research contributions and the lessons learned on tackling it.
2
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1.2 Research Challenges and Contributions
The overall aim of the work presented in this dissertation is at enabling easy, safe and regu-
latory compliant data sharing among healthcare organisations, and to facilitate the creation of
interoperable EHR systems.
The thesis reports the identified challenges and research contributions within three differ-
ent research threads. We start by analysing the challenges related to regulatory compliance
in cross-organisation and cross-regulation data sharing, with the focus on developing tools to
establish the links between regulatory policies and operations on data. We then focus on the
required technology to support cross-organisation service integration. We describe a data shar-
ing protocol and privacy policies and how they can achieve privacy-aware data sharing. Finally,
we analyse the research challenges related to access control policy violation detection and we
propose an approach to prevent such violations.
1.2.1 Compliance-Aware Medical Record Sharing
Data protection regulations define rules on medical records management at different levels,
starting from unions/federations [69, 76] to individual countries [83, 132], internal regions or
municipalities [128, 129] and specifically for data sharing within EHRs [94, 142]. Such reg-
ulatory complexity, in combination with the existence of different technical standards to ad-
dress interoperability challenges [60, 93], has resulted in the development of many different
nation-wide EHR architectures [36, 133, 136, 143]. On the other hand, each healthcare or-
ganisation, even when subject to the same regulatory policies and standards, can interpret and
implement these policies and requirements differently in its internal IT environments. There-
fore, for healthcare organisations to participate to cross-organisational EHR programs and to
share medical data with others, they need to adapt their systems to satisfy a defined set of data
management requirements and conform to the required EHR standards [9]. For these organi-
sations, achieving interoperability is therefore a complex and challenging task. The challenges
consist of:
• Analysing and mapping regulatory policies described in natural language into business-
level specifications and then into privacy-aware enforceable data sharing mechanisms;
• Ensuring that data sharing mechanisms and privacy policies respect organisation specific
requirements and best practices after the organisation joins the EHR sharing network;
• Developing, maintaining and evolving the IT infrastructure to support data sharing mech-
anisms and interoperability with other healthcare organisations.
We view the addressing of the these challenges and the development of compliance-aware
data sharing mechanisms as a multidisciplinary task where business, IT and privacy experts
3
1.2. CHALLENGES AND CONTRIBUTIONS CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
need to collaborate towards the common goal of building the technology for sharing privacy
sensitive data.
Contributions
To tackle these challenges, our approach is to develop a solution that can be offered as a ser-
vice to healthcare organisations to facilitate the exchange of healthcare data. We want to equip
organisations with the flexibility to accommodate a variety of regulatory compliance require-
ments and security and privacy policies, as these requirements and policies vary from country
to country, from company to company, and over time.
Our key idea in addressing this lies in providing organisations with a methodology and
the corresponding technology for mapping data owner’s requirements into Business Processes
Models (BPM) [139]. The resulting processes are then embedded into data management op-
erations and executed inside the execution environment. As a consequence, organisations will
be able to achieve compliant data management, and therefore cross-organisation and cross-
regulation medical record sharing. More specifically, we propose:
• A methodology for establishing explicit links between high-level regulatory policies on
one side, and detailed data management processes and privacy policies on the other;
• A compliance-aware data management system called CHINO that supports processes
and policy definition and execution. As a result, CHINO manages (stores and shares)
participant organisations’ medical records according to their regulatory policies.
The methodology starts with the collection of business and compliance requirements that
are later refined in the definition of executable data management processes and privacy policies.
CHINO provides the technology to support the methodology and offers the modelling frame-
work to enable participant organisations to model the business processes that implement the
internal business logic of data management operations.
To evaluate the CHINO methodology and our system prototype, we examined regulatory
and architectural differences among EHR systems and validated the prototype by integrating
it with an existing medical record system called OpenMRS [146] and executing the identified
policies. We tested process modelling usability with business process experts to ensure that they
were able to easily define data sharing process models according to identified requirements.
Finally, with privacy experts we analysed how CHINO execution framework can achieve
regulatory compliance in the Italian legislation context. Overall, the CHINO technology, and
in particular its visual modelling representations of business processes, provides great visibil-
ity and transparency to security/compliance officers and business process analysts, and thus
improves the trust, compliance and understandability among the participant healthcare organi-
sations in terms of data sharing.
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1.2.2 Architectures, Protocols and Policies for Privacy-Aware Sharing
While the previous research thread focuses on providing mechanisms to define regulatory com-
pliant data management operations, this one is focused on the development of the underlying
technology to support data management operations execution. Namely, this thread focuses on
defining the operations interfaces, data sharing protocol, enforceable privacy policies, and com-
ponents to store data and policies. The resulting contributions therefore, provide the necessary
technology to support the process-based approach to defined data management operations de-
scribed within the CHINO platform.
We start by analysing the challenges while enabling the cooperation among institutions de-
livering socio-healthcare assistance services. These services involve both healthcare and social
assistance such as the delivery of assistance at home or residential care, and are provided by
many public and private institutions. From a technical and organisational perspective, the de-
velopment of data sharing solutions in this kind of scenario is challenging because:
1. The integration approach needs to depart from “traditional” data integration by requiring
a light-weight process integration able to involve a large number of medium and small
institutions that also dynamically grow over time (civic centres, hospitals and social care
institutions will need to progressively join the initiative);
2. The exchanged information is privacy-sensitive containing patients’ social, health and
financial data and making privacy policy definition challenging. Furthermore, the assis-
tance processes are highly knowledge-based, sometimes not completely defined, spanning
across several organisations and are executed by heterogeneous IT systems;
3. Strict privacy rules defined by data protection regulations and, most importantly, by guide-
lines for health records management [83, 94, 143] forbid the adoption of traditional data
warehousing and integration approaches. Those rules and national-wide standards forbid
collecting data in a central repository and define strict legal constraints on the way data is
collected, stored and distributed in a context with multiple organisations.
Such constraints make it difficult to identify application protocols and policies for data in-
tegration. Since the Italian healthcare sector configuration and Data Protection laws are similar
to many EU [69, 136] and non-EU [36, 76] countries, the problem is quite general.
To tackle the specificity of this integration scenario, the technology needs to preserve the
organisation specific requirements and information systems, and at the same time, share data
according to privacy laws and technical standards.
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Contributions
We propose an integration approach that focuses on identifying and sharing events generated
inside the assistance processes. The events contain the data generated by information system
of participant organisations’ within assistance process steps (i.e. while caregivers deliver some
assistance). To reduce the disclosure of privacy sensitive data, we separate the events content
into two kinds of data: metadata and records. While the records contain the detailed data
content, metadata describe the records by reporting patient identity, when the record has been
generated, and by whom. To share metadata and records, we provide an event-based protocol
that delivers metadata to interested parties via a publish/subscribe mechanism [68], and then
share the records only upon explicit requests which express the purpose of use. To limit data
disclosure and deliver only the data that is necessary for the specified purpose of use, we give
data consumers the option to specify fine-grained filtering policies over records, and to define
which portions of records to be delivered to data consumers.
Overall, the proposed approach and technology provide the following contributions:
1. We show how a data integration problem in a multi-organisation and rapidly evolving
environment can be addressed via an event-based approach. It makes it easy for new insti-
tutions to come on-board, and minimise the development and maintenance effort required
for the integration;
2. We describe how privacy protection and data sharing can coexist by restricting the access
to information only on demand and providing fine-grained privacy policies to constrain
on who can see what and for which purpose;
3. We present the architecture and implementation of a solution that achieves integration
of socio-health assistance services, and discusses the many lessons we have learned by
deploying an instance of it in the Province of Trento, Italy, and testing it with the involved
institutions.
The source code of the developed system has been also released under the GPL v3 free
software license [77] and made available at the European Commissions Joinup repository [48].
1.2.3 Access Control Policy Violation Prevention
The previous research thread describes a data sharing protocol that relies on fine-grained access
control policies to govern data disclosure. However, when data sources specify policies on
their data (e.g. on their local schema or records), they cannot anticipate semantic inferences
when data is integrated at the EHR level [131, 172]. Such inferences (e.g. given by functional
dependencies which provide semantic constrains over attributes in a relational schema) can
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allow malicious users to obtain prohibited information by linking multiple queries and thus
violate the data sources’ policies. Therefore there is the need to proactively detect and prevent
policy violations before the policies are deployed and enforced.
Contributions
We propose a set of algorithms that, given the EHR (relational) schema, the functional depen-
dencies that holds on it, and the sources policies, are able to identify the sets of queries that,
if linked based on the functional dependencies, lead to policy violations. These sets of queries
that can lead to policy violations are also called violating transactions. To avoid the completion
of a violating transaction, we propose a query cancellation algorithm that identifies a minimum
set of queries that needs to be avoided. The identified sets of queries are then used to generate
additional rules to be added to the existing set of rules provided by data sources to prevent the
leakage of any prohibited information. We validated our algorithms on downloaded datasets
from the web and synthetic datasets.
1.2.4 Summary of Contributions
In summary, the thesis reports three research threads that aim at proposing technologies for
enabling privacy and compliance aware medical record sharing and thus, facilitate the creation
of EHR systems. The Figure 1.1 depicts a high level EHR logical architecture and identifies the
research contributions of each of the threads.
On top it shows the organisations interacting with the EHR to store and share data. To inter-
act with the EHR, they need to develop adapters that support the interaction protocol proposed
by the EHR (as detailed in Chapter 4). The adapters will receive and consume the data produced
by other organisations.
Within the EHR architecture we identify three logical layers: data management interfaces
(or Application Programming Interfaces - APIs), data management operations implementation
(or business logic), and components that store data and policies and that can be internal or
decentralised (e.g. external data stores).
The thesis contributions reported within the three research threads tackle different aspects
of the overall EHR system architecture. Namely, the research thread 1 introduced in 1.2.1 and
detailed in Chapter 3 focuses on the compliance within data management operations and it
proposes a process-based approach and the related technology to define and execute operations
internal business logic. We allow the organisations to define such business logic by the business
process modelling framework.
The thread 2 in 1.2.2 and Chapter 4 focuses on developing the data sharing protocol, op-
erations interfaces, the technology (i.e. the design of the internal components), and the policy
7
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Components 
(internal or decentralised)
Data Management Operations Implementation
(business logic)
PoliciesData
Organisation 1 Organisation 2 Organisation N
Research 
thread 2Research 
thread 1
Research 
thread 3
Interfaces
Protocol
Technology
Compliance-Aware 
Data Management 
Operations
Policy Violation 
Prevention
Data Management Interfaces
Policy Enforcement
Technology
AdapterAdapter Adapter Adapters
Figure 1.1: The presented research topics and their contributions in building EHR systems.
enforcement. In addition, as detailed in Chapter 4, it provides also adapters to organisations
to facilitate the interaction with the EHR. Finally, the thread 3 in 1.2.3 focuses on challenges
related to access control policy violation prevention.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis structure follows the sequence of reported contributions and is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 gives an overview of research efforts in related areas. It starts by analysing some
of important projects and initiatives in building EHR systems and technological standards. Then
for each of the three research threads, it identifies the related work and state of the art solutions.
Chapter 3 describes our work done in the first research thread on compliance-aware medical
record sharing. It starts by identifying regulatory differences among different states and pro-
posed technologies. Then it shows how business process technology can be used to model data
sharing processes and policies to achieve compliance. It reports the system validation phases
by integrating with the existing EHR systems, performing a user study with BPM experts and
by collaborating with privacy experts.
Chapter 4 reports our work in the second thread on EHR architectures and data sharing
protocols to achieve privacy-aware data sharing. It describes the motivating scenario and chal-
lenges, the data sharing protocol, and the system prototype that has been developed and tested
in Trentino, Italy. It also describes how the proposed technology provides the basis for the work
described in Chapter 3.
Chapter 5 describes how we tackled challenges related to the access control policies vi-
olations in a data integration scenario. It shows how data inference (e.g. using functional
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dependencies) can disclose prohibited information, and how the proposed algorithms can help
guard the design of the access control policies.
Chapter 6 summarises our research contributions and the lessons learned while develop-
ing data sharing systems in healthcare. It describes also some limitations and potential future
extension on the identified three research threads.
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The thesis contributions has been also published within the following peer-reviewed publica-
tions. The first three works describe the CHINO methodology and technology. The next three
works (number 4, 5 and 6) report our contributions described in Chapter 4 while the work in
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Chapter 2
State of the Art
This section analyses the state of the art literature related to the topics and research areas covered
by this thesis. Following the overall structure of the thesis, we start by analysing how the chal-
lenges related to regulatory compliance has been tackled within existing healthcare IT solutions.
We focus in particular on the workflow based technologies and their adoption in healthcare to
facilitate the regulatory compliance. Then we review technologies that have been proposed to
solve interoperability and privacy related challenges in medical record sharing. Finally, we fo-
cus on access control aspects and challenges related to access control policy definition to protect
patients’ privacy.
2.1 Health Information Systems
Data sharing about EHR systems, and more in general, about Health Information Systems (HIS)
represents one of the key features to enable such systems to exchange data and provide many
benefits such as cost reduction, improvement of the quality of care, better control of adverse
drug events and many more [89, 145]. To achieve data sharing, EHR systems need to provide
mechanisms to interconnect different Electronic Medical Record (EMR) systems owned and
managed by single points of care (e.g. OpenMRS [146]). Such mechanisms need to provide ef-
fective and efficient protocols and standards to collect privacy-sensitive data from single EMRs
and implement data sharing mechanisms and protocols to deliver data to users (patients and
clinicians) that need to access to them. The same data, after being properly anonymised, is
used also for Business Intelligence over assistance processes to identify bottlenecks and mon-
itor service delivery. The data can be used also for research purposes and for augmenting the
knowledge about specific (and sometimes rare) diseases [166]. Another application of EHRs is
to provide data for the creation of Personal (or Personally Controlled) Electronic Health Record
systems (PHR) in which patients are able to create data (e.g. self monitoring) in addition to
the possibility to visualise data produced by hospitals. By doing so PHR solutions, among
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the other benefits, are able to empower the patients and increase their knowledge about their
disease management process [89]. An example of such systems is Indivo [113] project from
Harward-MIT.
The importance of such systems has resulted in different projects an action plans by gov-
ernments from all over the world. Namely, many nations have started national-wide projects
aiming at financing and supporting EHR development [123]. Solutions have been developed
aiming at providing common national-wide backbone infrastructure for interconnecting EMR
systems used by single hospitals. The NHS - Spine in UK [133, 132], Canada Health Infoway
[36], Dutch AORTA [136], Italian inFSE [143] are just some of examples of such initiatives and
projects. One of such projects called CSS – Cartella Socio Sanitaria [11] developed to create
health and social record in Trentino Province, Italy is part of this thesis. We describe the tech-
nology we developed and the research outcomes. The project source code has been released as
open source code [48].
Other open source projects and initiatives such as Direct Project [169] or OpenEHR [170,
27] have been developed to harmonize the EHR standards at national levels and standardise the
EHR content to be exchanged among organizations. Projects such as the EU cross-country ep-
SOS [67] have been proposed to interconnect the Member States national systems and exchange
patient summaries and ePrescriptions.
Developing such systems involves different types of challenges affecting the project devel-
opment phases (from analysis do the development and runtime). Namely, starting from the
early analysis there is the need for collecting the set of regulations and laws and technical
standards that are related to the scenario that is considered by the project. This is challenging
because regulations varies from states and countries and are defined at different levels. Once
identified, the regulations and guidelines need to be analysed to extract design requirements
and constrains. Later in Chapter 3 we report a subset of privacy policies that has been extracted
from the HIPAA [76] and Italian Data Protection legislation while next subsection details on
how regulatory compliance has been tackled by other works. Once analysed the regulations and
identified the set of constrains and requirements, the system designers need to choose the ap-
propriate technology that is able to enforce and satisfy them. Finally, the developed technology
needs to be inspected by privacy and legal experts before going into production. This activity
can lead to observations, and in worst case to rejection, of the developed technology. Those
kind of inspections can be done also at runtime in case of legally motivated activities [84].
Before detailing on state of the art technologies and standards that has been proposed to
build EHR systems, we will detail on how state of the art works have solved privacy-aware data
sharing and, more in general regulatory compliance.
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2.2 Regulatory Compliance
The impact of regulations on organizations’ operating processes is one of the most important
research topics nowadays. In healthcare, data protection laws, regulations and technical guide-
lines define different types of requirements on how data need to be collected, managed (stored
and used for different purposes) and shared among healthcare providers or third parties. The
intrinsic complexity of both regulations and healthcare sector makes the application and verifi-
cation of regulatory policies an extremely challenging task.
Challenges start with the collection of the set of regulations and guidelines that need to be
considered while developing an IT solution for a specific use case. For example, the Italian
context is characterized by many levels of authorities which protect citizen’s privacy rights:
starting from the EU level legislations [69, 70] transposed in Italy with the Data Protection
Code [83], to the Guidelines and recommendations provided by the Italian Data Protection
Authority in collaboration with the Ministry of Health on Electronic Health Records [94, 143].
Then each region has its own competences on applying healthcare legislation, which is done by
many local healthcare providers called “Azienda Sanitaria Locale (ASL)” that deliver assistance
services to patients [128, 129]. This shows clearly that in Italy, but this applies also to other
countries, there exist many bodies having different competences that define privacy legislations
on different aspects.
Once identified the set or regulations, there is the need to “parse" them and extract policies
and requirements. Different works have been done to in such direction to extract requirements
in a systematic manner [9]. Usually those works describe approaches that can be applied to
the translation of regulations into requirements or event further into design of compliant system
functionalities according to rights and obligations expressed by regulations. Some of these
works that we have identified include [33, 98, 159, 103]. The work [82] analyses regulatory
aspects in a multi-jurisdictional and outsourced setting such as cloud-based solutions. Although
the analysed scenario is similar to ours, enforcement aspects are not considered. The work
[37] analyses privacy obligations and provides a framework for obligations specification and
enforcement. Such approach is not sufficient to achieve the compliance-aware data sharing
goal defined in this thesis, as it does not consider remote policy enforcement points or data
stores. Other works provide an approach in designing legal patterns that can satisfy the legal
requirements [101].
The extracted requirements define constrains on the HIS systems architecture and on their
run-time behaviour [28]. For example, according to Italian Data Protection law [94], health
care sensitive data should remain under the responsibility of the data controllers (i.e. entities
that produce the data). Such constrains affect deeply HIS design choices as it is shown in our
work [11]. The design phase therefore need to consider regulatory compliance which involves
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many challenges related to the definition, enforcement and monitoring of constraints extracted
from regulations [11, 165, 164, 163]. These challenges are even more difficult to tackle in
multi-organisation environments where multiple heterogeneous entities are involved [11, 164,
87, 140].
When HIS projects involve multiple institutions, one of the key factors for their success is
given by identifying the appropriate project management methodology that is able to involve
the stakeholders and domain experts during the elicitation and validation of the requirements
[24]. Representing visually such requirements (e.g. by using diagrams) in a form that is un-
derstandable by the stakeholders, and useful to the developers to extract design requirements,
can be of fundamental importance [29]. Languages and formalisms like workflow modelling,
BPMN [139] and activity diagrams can be very powerful to model concisely complex interac-
tions [62, 153]. We have applied successfully in one of our case studies described in Chapter
4 the extended activity diagrams. However, sometimes such representations are not sufficient
and other frameworks could be needed to model the project scenario [13]. In one of our works
in Chapter 3 we adopt BPM technology [139] to design and develop executable business pro-
cesses and to face legal and organizational requirements [164], or to model and execute cross-
organizational health processes [168].
Another important question is how to meet privacy regulations while managing health care
data in outsourced environments. In such cases, a solution that manages health care data must
meet business and compliance requirements. The business requirements provide usually the
sequence of steps that need to be performed by the involved participants in a given scenario (e.g.
the work in [141] analyses and represents the doctor-consultation use case with UML style state-
diagrams). The compliance requirements instead, are usually extracted from regulations and
sometimes are represented as simplified checklists [28], that has to be applied to the considered
scenarios.
Our research focuses in particular on exploiting requirement-modelling languages and on
designing execution environment to support compliant data management. In this direction, the
GEODAC [109] framework provides both the modelling language and the run time execution
environment to ensure data protection and apply the data assurance policies specified by the
customers. The GEODAC work is focused on the modelling language for the service providers
and the service customers to communicate their data assurance policies. It provides a pol-
icy specification language for the service provider and the service customer to communicate
their data assurance policies but it does not provide policy enforcement points orchestration
and processes visibility. The importance of process visibility aspect is emphasized by work
[29], which demonstrates that with visual representation of business processes, systems could
improve the trust, compliance and understandability of data management processes. To the
best of our knowledge, nobody has applied the idea of modelling and defining the behaviour
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of compliance-aware data sharing operations by adopting process modelling languages as it is
done in this work. In [164] we propose a model-driven methodology to collect requirements
and define compliant processes and policies that are executed inside the proposed execution
framework.
Another important approach that has been proposed to tackle the complexity of achieving
privacy compliance is given by the Privacy by Design principles [40, 156, 39]. Privacy by
Design principles has emerged recently as the most suitable approach in tackling privacy related
issues and has been successfully applied in many projects and cases such as [23, 102]. Privacy
by Design considers the privacy related aspects from early stages of systems design and has
been introduced also by the Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party in the document The Future
of Privacy [16] and the new European Data Protection Regulation [72].
Compliance-Aware Business Process Design is the approach we follow in our work de-
scribed in Chapter 3. We start by observing that one of the main aspects that solutions that
manage privacy-sensitive data need to ensure, is the transparency in data management [121].
Transparency is needed for regulatory reasons and to ease concern over the potential for data
breaches. The work [46] states that one of the most important aspects of control is transparency
in the implementation. Workflow transparency in one of the key contributions of this thesis
since business processes technology is used to implement internal behaviour of basic data man-
agement functionalities [164] and 3. Some of the benefits of process visualization are better
requirements satisfaction [29]. The authors demonstrate that visualizing operating processes
can bring to better understanding and continuous improvement of regulatory compliance in the
risk management field.
Another important aspect is given by the need of process validations through compliance
checking and ensuring constrains satisfaction [154, 96]. The survey [96] gives a brief overview
of the state of the art technology in business processes and compliance checking. Different
approaches exist in enabling compliance within business processes. One approach is given by
adding annotations to diagrams that are later transformed in executable mechanisms or lan-
guages. The work [52] provides a framework and a model-driven methodology for specifying
security policies through process annotations. The final result is given by BPEL executable pro-
cesses. The work[44] provides an integration of BPMN[139] with privacy policies to verify if
the resulting process is compliant with P3P privacy policies. Other works such as[108] provide
a language for expressing data retention policies that are required for compliance aware data
management. It provides a language and a framework for their definition and execution. Those
approaches give some advices and useful methodologies that will be further investigated.
Works such as [90, 118] annotates business processes with clauses, conditions and secu-
rity policies that need to be satisfied at each process step. Instead we provide BPMN custom
elements in addition to standard BPMN to model security, privacy and other constrains. Fur-
15
2.2. ARCHITECTURES AND PROTOCOLS CHAPTER 2. STATE OF THE ART
thermore these works focus on verifying compliance on existing processes. In [26] process
execution logs are analysed to evaluate privacy policies and disclosure of data in relation to
process goals. Instead, this thesis focus is on process design to achieve compliance. The works
reported by [110, 122] provide methodologies for inter-organization process design in the con-
text of business contracts, while [21] synthetize process templates starting from compliance
requirements. In contrast, our focus is on designing compliant processes that implement data
management operations. However, these process design techniques can be certainly leveraged
in our methodology to support developers and business analysts when developing regulatory
compliant processes. The work [148] demonstrates how workflows can also improve compli-
ance to clinical guidelines. A work that advocates the need of a different approach in using BPM
technologies in healthcare is given by [115] where the lightweight processes, called proclets,
exchange messages through communication channels and collectively implement healthcare
processes. The work in Chapter 3 adopts a similar approach with a similar vision about the
need of using lightweight processes to implement data management operations.
The compliance aspects can be ensured only if the underlying technology that provides data
sharing protocols is safe from security and privacy points of view. In the next section we report
state of the art technologies and protocols that has been proposed to manage healthcare data
according to security and privacy constrains.
2.3 Architectures and Protocols for Medical Record Sharing
From a system design point of view, Service Oriented Architectures (SOA) [6] emerged as most
commonly used paradigm for achieving interoperability in multi-organisation contexts. The
SOA paradigm is adopted to tackle point-to-point synchronous interactions and it can become
easily unmanageable in a scenario with many actors and systems impersonating dynamic roles
and increasing in number. Event Driven Architectures - EDA [68] can solve such problem by
decoupling service providers and consumers through asynchronous messaging. In our solutions
described in Chapters 3 and 4 we adopted a mixed EDA-SOA driven approach [119] in which
involved entities exchange data through WS invocation while the platforms implement the pub-
/sub [68] functionalities through a Service Bus [126, 8] to exchange asynchronously data. A
similar approach has been proposed in [125], as both approaches use events to transfer informa-
tion by pub/sub although our case is more general because it is not limited to mobile devices.
In Italy, a specific SOA based architecture called SPC [58] has been proposed to interconnect
public administrations. We had as a requirement in our project the considering of such design
guidelines and therefore the developed system described in Chapter 4 has been tested inside the
SPC network. The SOA and EDA provide communication patterns and security standards to
deal with data transmission.
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Another important problem is how to represent, store and share privacy sensitive data. The
Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise - IHE consortium [93] proposes a set of solutions target-
ing the semantic and syntactic integration aspects (applied to EHR projects such as Canada
Health Infoway [36], Dutch AORTA [136], Italian inFSE [143], UK NHS [133], European
cross-country epSOS project [67]) based on a central registry of searchable meta-data linked to
the data generated by producers (typically encoded as HL7 and CDA [60]). Various implemen-
tations of registries exist such as UDDI, ebXML, XML/EDI [180]. The most appropriate in
terms of flexibility, interoperability and adoption for the healthcare domain [64, 59] is ebXML
by OASIS [124] that we adopted in our project by using the freebXML instance [78]. Privacy
regulations impose constrains (not always well defined) on the design of the health information
systems and on their run-time behaviour. For example, according to [94, 143] healthcare sen-
sitive data should remain under the responsibility of the data controllers. In such systems, the
definition, enforcement and monitoring of privacy constraints [43] is fundamental especially in
multi-domain environments where multiple heterogeneous entities are involved [140]
At the interoperability layer, many types of solutions have been proposed to manage health-
care data. In particular recently we observed a high adoption of BPM technologies with the
aim at improving interoperability and service quality [105]. While works such as [42] proposes
BPM to model cross-organization or cross-department processes, we propose the use of BPM
to model and execute internal operations over data. As shown in Chapter 3, BPM in addition
to compliance, can facilitate also interoperability and building more easily the technology for
medical record management in cross-regulation settings.
The technology is necessary to ensure secure and safe medical record management. It ensure
the delivery of information according to rules that define the users’ access capabilities and rights
on medical records. Therefore, to achieve privacy-aware data management, access control is
fundamental. Next subsection analyses state of the art solutions to implement access control in
healthcare settings.
2.4 Access Control for Medical Record Sharing
There exist several approaches to tackle the challenges of securing the access to data in multi-
organisation environments. Privacy preserving disclosure strategies assumes that as long as
the data has not been published yet and is stored on a trusted server, which thus is not vulnera-
ble to attacks[79], the data is safe. After publishing, the data cannot be protected anymore, and
therefore it need to be made less privacy-sensitive. Works in such direction such as k-anonimity,
l-diversity, anonimity-plausibility, limited retention, data degradation and many more are accu-
rately analysed by this survey[79].
The work done in this thesis (in all the three chapters), approaches the privacy related chal-
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lenges by ensuring appropriate access control. Access control is part of the disclosure preven-
tion strategies that have been proposed by server-side mechanisms such as access control, P3P,
and server-side encryption or applied by client-side mechanisms such as P4P [61] and client-
side encryption [75]. Disclosure prevention provides security mechanisms mainly through ac-
cess control and encryption to prevent unauthorised access. This aspect is currently becoming
of high importance in cloud based environments, where the main challenge consist of protect-
ing data in untrusted environments [38]. A common approach is to outsource entirely encrypted
data that prevents unauthorized intrusions. This approach forbids the performing of searching
operations over data. Some of the revolutionary research works provide mechanism to perform
search operations over encrypted data with fully homomorphic encryption schemas[80]. An-
other issue is how to manage encrypted data and the related encryption and decryption keys at
large-scale. A mechanism and full implementation of an efficient and scalable data- and key-
store is proposed by [108]. In our works we focus on defining access control policies such that
only authorized users can access to certain medical information.
Purpose Based Access Control provides an efficient privacy disclosure prevention method-
ology to achieve a balance between privacy and utility of data. In fact, in healthcare an impor-
tant aspect that needs to be satisfied is the contextual integrity which measure the closeness
of the conformity of personal information with context-relative informational norms [25]. For
example, medical information shared with someone outside the health-care context represent a
violation of privacy. The work [26] provides a methodology for designing business processes
and privacy rules that satisfy privacy goals and organizations utility. This approach can be useful
to complete our model-driven approach. The work [95] describes a interesting approach for de-
livering data on a purpose based need-to-know basis. This is achieved through the definition of
purposes of use. With [11] we propose access control policies to preserve privacy in data shar-
ing in an event-driven environments. We define in particular fine-grained access control policies
based on a purpose of use of data. The purpose-based access control is normally considered a
good solution for meeting the requirements of privacy legislations. The purpose taxonomy for
the healthcare domain is well defined at national level in Italy [94]. It has been preferred to
identity-based access methods, such as RBAC, because of its efficiency and suitability in multi-
organization and variable context that usually present the role explosion problem. For that
purpose, RBAC extensions such as P-RBAC[135] has been proposed that extends RBAC with
privacy annotations such as purposes, event-condition-actions and obligations.
In Chapters 3 and 4 we defined a protocol and privacy policies for data sharing in event-
driven [68] environments that satisfy the data sources needs. In [164] these mechanisms are
incorporated into the business process execution in order to achieve privacy-aware data sharing.
In [11] we apply a purpose-based access control mechanism that has been favoured by the
identity-based access control frameworks such as Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [155],
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because of its suitability in multi-organization and variable contexts [135]. In fact, RBAC
policies such as Ponder [54] present the role explosion problem that does not apply to purpose-
based mechanisms such as Privacy-Aware Role-Based Access Control (P-RBAC) [135]. In
P-RBAC and similar works, an intended purpose is defined for each data object specifying the
intended usage of that data object. The access purpose is attached to each request and only when
an access purpose is compliant to its intended purpose the access is allowed. This approach
has been adopted also in [11] with some differences such as definition of sub-document level
policies.
In other mechanisms such as the one presented in [95], the purpose is used to define patient-
centric authorization model and categorization and policy definitions. Such mechanisms could
be considered to further improve CHINO data disclosure. In systems such as CHINO many
challenge are related with protecting sensitive data in untrusted environments [46]. Security in
exchanging data is approached by many works such as [181] that proposes a system to securely
exchange healthcare data in peer-to-peer fashion. The proposed system is based on cryptog-
raphy and secure key sharing. Our work instead proposes centralized policy management and
aims at enforcing also organization specific requirements. Our previous work [108] consid-
ers the key management issues and provides a mechanism to support an efficient and scalable
encryption key store that we will consider for future CHINO extension.
An important challenge is given by how to represent access control policies in a SOA/EDA
environment. A variety of policy representation standards have been proposed by using XML
language [116] including the definition of purpose based policies. Policy specification lan-
guages such as P3P [182] and access control languages such as IBM’s EPAL or, previously
mentioned, OASIS’ XACML [124] allow users to express privacy requirements in terms of the
authorized purposes of the data when it is released to a third party [7]. A standard that better
suits in distributed and inter-applications communication scenario is given by eXtensible Access
Control Markup Language - XACML [124]. Pure XACML is used as the policy specification
language for both document-level and attributed-level access control mechanisms [183]. To
best fit to web services it has been extended to support a fine-grained security enforcement [45].
Some approaches rewrite queries [111] while the work [53] proposes a fine-grained solution
for the definition and enforcement of access restrictions directly on the structure and content of
the documents providing a specific XML response with its Document Type Definition - DTD.
In [11] we apply the same idea using XML schema - XSD instead of DTD as it is more suit-
able for Web Service invocations. There are also other type of approaches in specifying access
control based on the specified purpose such as [95] which defines an interesting approach in
categorization and policy definitions. Its suitability for this research work will be further inves-
tigated. To enforce XACML policies we use an engine written in Java language [66]. Although
these access control mechanisms are sufficient for healthcare scenarios to exchange data among
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authorized parties, they may not be suitable to other scenarios where data inferences could be
used by malicious users to mine prohibited information.
Access control in information integration scenarios represents a challenging and funda-
mental task to enforce the appropriate authorization policies [30, 134]. In particular in federated
database scenarios where sources are exposed through a mediator as one single database (see
[158] for a survey). In data integration systems [106], a set of sources are exposed through a me-
diator as one single database. The mediator offers a unique entry point to all sources. In such
system defining access control policies is a challenging and fundamental task to be achieved
[30]. In work shown in Chapter 5, to define access control rules we rely on authorization views
that are expressed by means of datalog rules. In [5] the authors consider the use of metadata to
model both purposes of access and user preferences. We do not consider these concepts explic-
itly, but they could be simulated by using predicates while defining the access control rules. The
authors of [57] analysed different aspects related to access control in federated contexts [158].
They identified the role of administrators at mediator and local levels and proposed an access
control model that accommodates both mediator and source policies. In [104], the authors pro-
pose an access control model based on both allow and deny rules and algorithms that are able to
check if a query containing joins can be authorized. This work, like the previous one, does not
consider any association/correlation between attributes or objects that can arise at global level
when joining different independent sources.
Sensitive associations happen when some attributes, when put together, lead to disclosure
of prohibited information. Preventing the access to sensitive associations becomes crucial (see,
e.g., [4, 47]) in a distributed environment where each source could provide one part of it. In
[4], the authors proposed a distributed architecture to ensure no association between attributes
could be performed while in [47] fragmentation is used to ensure that each part of sensitive in-
formation is stored in a different fragment. In [55], the authors propose an approach to evaluate
whether a query is allowed against all the authorization rules. It targets query evaluation phase
while our goal is to derive additional authorization rules to be added to the mediator.
Inferences induced by data dependencies such as functional dependencies (FDs) are diffi-
cult to identify and solve while defining or applying privacy policies (see [74] for a survey).
In [179], the authors provide an anonymisation algorithm that considers FDs while identifying
which portion of data needs to be anonymised. In our case, we focus on defining access control
policies that should be used to avoid privacy breaches instead of applying privacy-preserving
techniques [79]. In [130], the authors proposed an approach to automatically generate, from ac-
cess control policies defined over database relations, the access control policies that are needed
to control materialized views to ensure data confidentiality. Although this work allows for in-
ferring policies it does not consider functional dependencies.
In [56] and [167] for each inference channel that is detected, either the schema of the
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database is modified or security level is increased. In [56], a conceptual graph based approach
has been used to capture semantic relationships between entities. The authors show that this
kind of relationships could lead to inference violations. In [167], the authors consider inference
problem using FDs. This work does not consider authorization rules dealing with implicit as-
sociation of attributes; instead, the authors assume that the user knows the mapping between
the attributes of any FD. Other approaches such as [35, 171] analyse queries at runtime and if a
query creates an inference channel then it is rejected. In [171], both queries and authorization
rules are specified using first order logic. While the inference engine considers the past queries,
the functional dependencies are not taken into account. In [35], a history-based approach has
been considered for the inference problem. The authors have considered two settings: the first
one is related to the particular instance of the database. The second is only related to the schema
of both relations and queries. In our work, we focus on inferences to identify additional access
rules to be added to the mediator. In [85], we investigated how join queries could lead to au-
thorization violations. In this thesis, we generalize the approach in [85] by considering the data
inference problem.
Another related challenge is given by the background, external or adversial knowledge
which refers to the additional knowledge an user may have while querying a source of in-
formation. Works such as [117] and [41] analyse aspects related with combining the retrieved
knowledge from a system (e.g. Mediator) with external knowledge. These aspects, similarly to
inferences, are very important and need to be considered during the definition of privacy poli-
cies to avoid cases such as Netflix [131] where privacy sensitive information has been inferred
from anonymised data.
The challenges related to discovering functional dependencies in database systems has
been considered by many works due to their importance during design phase [114]. In our work
we focus in particular on functional dependencies that do not hold on all the tuple of a rela-
tion. This kind of functional dependencies has received different names. In [178], probabilistic
functional dependency are used to normalize a data integration schema constructed automati-
cally. In [91], the author discuss discovery of both functional dependency and partial function
dependencies. Their approach is based on the definition of equivalence classes within attributes
values to check the validity of a functional dependency or partial one. Then, the classical lattice
based method is used to avoid checking all the possible combination of attributes.
Another problem related to functional dependency is how to infer a set a functional depen-
dency on a view. This problem has been studied in [99] and [100]. More recently [73], the same
problem has been studied for a specific class of functional dependency. Namely, condition func-
tion dependency. In [97], different measures of partial functional dependencies are discussed.
In our work we consider the g3 measure. These works has been considered and could be used
in future to extract the exact sets of FDs from involved sources schemas.
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Chapter 3
Compliance-Aware Medical Record
Sharing
This chapter presents our work on tackling the challenges related to medical records sharing in
cross-organisation and cross-regulation settings.
It starts by analysing differences between the Italian and UK regulatory contexts and or-
ganisations’ specific requirements. Then it presents the CHINO Methodology and execution
framework, and describes how organisations can define compliant data sharing processes and
policies. It shows also how processes and policies are executed within the CHINO execution
framework.
Before concluding, it presents the following validation phases: (i) the CHINO integration
with OpenMRS to demonstrate technical interoperability, (ii) the usability study with business
process experts to demonstrates that process modelling is a feasible task within CHINO, and
(iii) the review of CHINO features and capabilities with respect to Italian privacy regulations
by collaborating with a privacy expert.
3.1 Introduction
To achieve medical record sharing, organizations need to deal with regulations that define rules
on healthcare data management at different levels, starting from unions/federations on to in-
dividual countries and regions. Such regulatory differences have resulted in the definition of
various interoperability standards and nation-wide Electronic Health Records (EHR) architec-
tures to interconnect healthcare organizations [69, 132].
In addition to privacy concerns, organizations also have their own business requirements
and needs in terms of healthcare data management, which result in custom data representations
and specific security protection mechanisms. Therefore, in order for healthcare organizations
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to share medical data with others, they need to adapt their systems to satisfy a defined set of
data management requirements in order to conform to the required EHR compliance policies.
For these organizations, achieving interoperability and exchanging data in compliance with
regulatory policies is therefore a complex and challenging task [9]. In particular, the challenges
consist of:
• Mapping regulatory policies described in natural language into business-level specifica-
tions and then into privacy-aware enforceable data sharing mechanisms;
• Ensuring that data sharing mechanisms and privacy policies respect organization specific
requirements after the organization joins the EHR sharing network;
• Developing, maintaining and evolving the IT infrastructure to support data sharing mech-
anisms and interoperability with other healthcare organizations.
The goal of our work is to design a common data sharing solution that can be offered as a service
to healthcare organizations to facilitate the exchange of healthcare data in a compliance-aware
manner. Existing commercial EHRs such as Practice Fusion [151], Microsoft HealthVault [120]
and other emerging cloud-based solutions today do offer medical record management, but only
according to a fixed set of regulatory policies and technical standards. Instead, we want to equip
organizations with the flexibility to accommodate a variety of regulatory compliance require-
ments and security and privacy policies, as these varies from country to country, from company
to company, and over time.
However, flexibility often comes with increased complexity. Namely, the key challenge in
providing greater flexibility sits in not increasing the difficulty of the system usage.
Our key idea in addressing this trade-off lies in providing organizations with a methodology
and a platform based on mapping data owner’s requirements into business processes which
are then embedded into data management operations. As a consequence, they will be able to
achieve compliant data management and cross-organization and cross-regulation medical record
sharing.
More in detail, we have i) identified a methodology for establishing explicit links between
high-level regulatory policies on one side and detailed data management processes and privacy
policies on the other, and ii) designed and developed a compliance-aware data management
system called CHINO that supports processes and policy execution.
The methodology starts with the collection of business and compliance requirements that
are later used in the definition of executable data management processes and privacy policies.
CHINO provides the technology to support the methodology execution and offers the following
unique features:
1. It provides the components and the modelling framework to enable participant organiza-
tions to define the business processes that implement the internal business logic of data
24
CHAPTER 3. COMPLIANCE 3.1. INTRODUCTION
management operations. The processes manage medical records according to organiza-
tions’ regulatory compliance requirements and security and privacy policies.
2. To facilitate the business process modelling activity and the policy enforcement, it pro-
vides i) a set of custom elements that facilitate access to low-level operations on data and
rules managed by the internal IT infrastructure components such as record store and meta-
data registry and ii) a set of policy enforcement templates that can be combined to model
the data sharing processes while enforcing identified policies.
3. To execute the organizations’ processes and policies it provides a shared execution envi-
ronment that supports data sharing across participant organizations.
To evaluate the CHINO approach and prototype, we examined regulatory and architectural dif-
ferences among EHR systems and validated the prototype by integrating it with existing EHR
systems and executing the identified policies. In particular, we analysed some common cross-
organizational data sharing scenarios in Italy and UK. We defined data sharing processes in
compliance to Italian and UK regulations and executed them inside CHINO. To test the data
sharing scenarios, we integrated CHINO with an open source medical record system called
OpenMRS [146]. In the integrated system, the data sharing processes are used to mediate two
OpenMRS instances belonging to the two regulatory contexts and having their own data man-
agement processes and policies. This integrated system demonstrates that with CHINO, organi-
zations are able to share medical records while being compliant with regulations and satisfying
their internal business requirements.
We report also the usability study in which we have validated the CHINO Modelling frame-
work usability with nine business process exerts to verify if they were able to model data man-
agement processes and policies according to identified set of requirements.
Our solution takes advantage of the techniques that have been developed for business pro-
cess modelling and execution, and applies them into the compliance-aware data management
domain. In particular we propose processes to implement granular data management operations
logic.
With the collaboration of a privacy expert, we reason about how business processes, and in
particular their visual modelling representations, can provide great visibility and transparency
to security/compliance officers and business process analysts, and thus improves the trust, com-
pliance and understandability among the participant healthcare organizations in terms of data
sharing [29]. Namely, we view the development of compliance-aware data sharing mechanisms
as a multidisciplinary task where business, IT and privacy experts need to work towards the
common goal of defining methods for sharing privacy sensitive data.
The focus of this and the following chapters is on the mechanisms and solutions to ensure
privacy and other compliance requirements and not the actual content exchanged. When used
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to manage qualified content from the semantic point of view, our service is able to achieve full
interoperability [149].
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 analyses regulatory compliance
issues and provides examples to show how data sharing regulatory policies vary among different
regimes. Section 3.3 presents the CHINO methodology to address compliance issues and define
data management processes. The elements that characterize the CHINO modelling framework
are detailed in Section 3.4. Their usage in enforcing the identified policies is described in Sec-
tion 3.5 through the definition of policy enforcement templates. Process examples describing
the templates usage are shown in Section 3.6 while Section 3.7 describes the CHINO architec-
ture and prototype implementation details. The validations are discussed in Section 3.8 where
we show the integration between CHINO and OpenMRS in subsection 3.8.1. We describe the
User Study with whom we validated the Modeling Framework usability in subsection 3.8.2
while in subsection 3.8.3 we discuss how CHINO can achieve regulatory compliance. We con-
clude this chapter in Section 3.9.
3.2 Motivating Scenario
To understand requirements and policy differences among regulations and EHR standards, we
analyzed some common cross-organization data sharing scenarios in Italy and UK. Such sce-
narios in practice are very important due to the current EU plans that aim at offering to citizens
integrated services across EU countries with projects such as epSOS [67]. Cross-organizational
data sharing can also cover the situation of cross-country data sharing.
The scenario we describe here is about doctor consultation. It starts with the patient re-
questing a visit to her personal doctor regarding a diabetes problem. The personal doctor then
requests a consultation from a diabetes expert (specialist). Once the specialist visited the patient
and gave his therapy suggestion, the doctor can prescribe appropriate medication to the patient.
While doctors and specialists may belong to different healthcare organizations, both need to
access the patients’ medical records and exchange data. To conform to privacy policies they
need to access only the minimum set of information necessary to carry out their tasks.
Our analysis of such scenarios focuses on the operating processes that cover policies and
interaction protocols between these actors. We paid particular attention on differences with
respect to privacy policies and entities responsible for applying them. The patients (or data sub-
jects) usually agree on participating to EHR programs and accept the terms the data is accessed
and shared. The EHR systems (or data controllers) produce and manage patients’ records. The
entity that is responsible for authorizing the disclosure of data (that we call data owner) varies
according to regulations, the context and motivation with which the data is accessed. The owner
can be either the data subject, controller or a third party in the cases when for example the pa-
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Figure 3.1: The doctor-consultation scenario as it is performed in two different regulatory contexts and
EHR systems.
tients are under certain age or the records are about mental health [69].
In Italy, the Italian Ministry of Health defined a national wide architecture for interoper-
able EHR systems [143] along with data exchange standards and protocols to meet EU and
national regulations on personal data protection [69, 83]. The hospitals act as data owners
that are authorized by data subjects (the patients) to collect and disclose their health records
to other healthcare organizations when needed. The patients can agree on data access policies
for specific categories of healthcare operators and to grant access rights to records [69, 83]. To
support information discovery, a hierarchical structure of metadata registries provides searching
functionalities over decentralized record stores administered by individual hospitals.
In contrast, in UK the NHS - Spine [132] system is based on a centralized architecture
for data discovery and storage. Patients explicitly grant access rights to requesters at each
access to their medical records. In both contexts under certain exceptional situations, such
as emergency or legally motivated cases, their authorizations can be overwritten and data is
disclosed automatically [142].
Figure 3.1 shows a high-level interaction diagram that summarizes how information shar-
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ing and interactions are carried out among actors according to compliance policies and EHR
systems in Italy [143] while Figure 3.1 shows how the same use case scenario is performed in
UK [132]. Beyond the observable differences with respect to the interaction patterns, other key
differences include:
1. Security policies, which define access control mechanisms, data encryption strategies and
locations where the records should reside. In Italy, the records are stored in decentralized
record stores inside individual hospital data centres while in UK they are stored at a back-
bone centralized record store. This implies the need for different data retrieval processes
(a6) to retrieve the record from the record stores.
2. Privacy policies, which define who can access which data under which conditions and
for which purpose. Conditions and purposes are usually defined by regulations along
with exceptional cases [83, 142]. Regulations identify also who need to act as data owner
applying data access policies and acting as Policy Enforcement Point. In Italy, the policies
are defined at the record creation phase (i.e. when patients accept to create their EHRs at
step a0 in Figure 3.1) and are applied by the EHR system on data requests (a5). Therefore
the EHR system acts as the enforcement point and provides mechanisms to take decisions
(a5) on requests [143]. In UK data owners apply the policies at runtime (b6) deciding to
allow or deny the access to their data [142]. These policy enforcement differences result
in different interaction protocols among different actors and systems.
3. Business specific requirements can be any organization-specific privacy, security, or
other technological related requirement. Such requirements can represent obstacles for
organizations in participating to EHR programs [159]. For example, organizations are
required to adopt specific audit strategies. Therefore the EHR should be able to interact
with the internal organization systems to send audit information in an appropriate format.
Furthermore, the data retrieval process (a6) could consist of the invocation of organization
specific Web Services following different standards (e.g., SOAP, REST and JMS).
Similar differences can be identified in other data exchange scenarios such as emergency
room case or legally motivated cases in which public authority requests can override owners’
policies. In such exceptional cases specific audit strategies need to be applied and records are
disclosed to requester without restrictions [83, 142]. Consequently, the special conditions and
auditing strategies have to be implemented and made transparent to auditors and privacy experts.
These exceptional cases lead to regime-specific solutions that are not cost-effective, since the
participating organizations need to adapt their systems and they become hard to maintain as rule
changes.
Table 3.1 summarizes the policies that have been identified during the regulatory analysis
and that will be later used to show how the proposed CHINO framework can express and enforce
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Category Policy Description
Security Identificationi All entities that access to data must be identified.
Safeguard Collected data should be kept secure from any potential abuses.
Access Data subjects should be allowed to access their data and make correc-
tions to any inaccurate data.
Accountability Data subjects should have a method available to them to hold data re-
questers accountable.
Integrity Data integrity should be verified upon retrieval and transmission.
Privacy Consent Data can be disclosed to third party when an entity (subject, controller
or somebody else) responsible for data management, called owner, gives
explicit consent. In special cases data can be accessed without the owner
consent (e.g. compliance with legal obligations, protect vital interest of
data subject, public interests).
Purpose Personal data can only be processed for specified explicit and legitimate
purposes and may not be processed further in a way incompatible with
those purposes.
Proportionality Personal data may be processed only insofar as it is adequate, relevant
and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected
and/or further processed.
PIStorage The data shouldn’t be kept in a form that permits identification of data
subjects.
Business
Specific
Require-
ments
CustomStandard While satisfying all the previous requirements, data controllers can
choose data representation standards and implement data management
solutions according to their needs.
PersonalAudit Data controllers are responsible for establishing auditing strategies to
ensure accountability on all operations over data.
PrivateStore Data controllers can be obliged to store records they produce inside spe-
cific administrative locations.
Table 3.1: List of identified policies and organization specific requirements and their description.
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Figure 3.2: The CHINO methodology and approach to define, translate, deploy and execute the data
management operations.
them. The list is not meant to be exhaustive although it covers the most important policies
identified in both regulatory contexts that we have analysed.
3.3 CHINO Methodology
The data sharing scenarios and policies presented in Section 3.2 demonstrate that a common
EHR system involving different healthcare organizations needs to support different regulatory
policies, interaction protocols, as well as organization specific requirements. We cope with the
problems identified above by defining a methodology to support compliance-aware data sharing
processes with organization-level customizations to manage (store, retrieve, and share) the data.
The methodology, as shown in Figure 3.2, consists of a sequence of steps performed by
different actors:
1. First, the Chief Information Officer of the organization identifies the business require-
ments describing, for example, the flow of interactions, business specific requirements,
and assigning flow steps to be fulfilled by different departments or organizations. Such
requirements are often described in natural language with operational models describing
how actors interact among them and with the EHR systems [132, 143].
2. Second, the Chief Compliance Officer of the organization reviews the business require-
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ments, and follows the compliance checklists to identify the necessary compliance re-
quirements, and security and privacy policies that need to be incorporated. For example,
to define at which step which security and privacy policies need to be applied, and to iden-
tify exceptional cases in which data can be disclosed without patients’ authorizations [83].
Examples of such checklists extracted from UK regulations can be found at Appendix B
of [142].
3. Third, a Business Analyst combines the business requirements and the compliance re-
quirements to devise a high-level representation that describes the steps that the involved
parties should follow [159]. Figure 3.1 reveals examples of such representations (with
many details omitted). The business analyst can also annotate the interaction diagram
with the corresponding security and privacy policies identified at Step 2 [105].
4. Fourth, the Business Analyst and System Developers translate the high-level representa-
tions into executable business processes and rules. The business processes implement the
business logic of granular data management operations such as PushRecord, GetRecord
and so on. The operations reflect the identified compliance-aware data exchange interac-
tion requirements and policies. Policies are then translated into security and privacy rules
that are incorporated into the business process steps and enforced through operations on
internal CHINO components.
5. Finally, the resulting executable business processes and rules are deployed and executed
into the shared execution environment.
The processes orchestrate multi-party human and system interactions including patients, doctors
and EHR systems. Business process steps access data through a set of operations that are
executed on internal IT system components such as medical record store and metadata registry.
Business process steps perform also the operations in terms of enforcing the defined security
and privacy rules at policy enforcement points. Some components such as data stores or policy
enforcement points can be also remote.
In summary, the CHINO methodology identifies the sequence of steps carried out by mul-
tiple stakeholders, from high-level business requirement collection to the low-level process ex-
ecution and policy enforcement. This work focuses on Steps 4 and 5 of the methodology,
i.e., on providing the technology to support the modelling and runtime aspects. The CHINO
technology, together with the methodology, proposes a way of tackling compliance issues in
multi-jurisdiction data-sharing scenario.
The analysis of activities related to requirement collection is discussed in several state-of-
the-art approaches such as [29, 122, 143, 159] and is not discussed further here. This work aims
instead at providing tools to enable involved actors, each one with its own skills, to collaborate
with others in defining compliant data sharing processes.
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Collectively, the business processes execution is able to meet the high-level compliance
requirements. The steps can be performed at design and/or runtime to define and improve the
compliant processes and policies. The methodology does not aim at identifying any specific
software development model (waterfall, spiral or agile), yet it is intended to encourage process
and policy improvements over time. In particular, the visual representation of policies should
facilitate process tuning over time when policies change.
Although similar methodologies have been applied to solve compliance issues in business
contracts and finance reporting [122], to the best of our knowledge, none of them solved the
regulatory compliance issues in the domain of EHR related data management. In particular,
none of them approached the implementation of data management operations through the def-
inition of business processes, as it is the case in this work. In the rest of this chapter, we will
present a modelling framework to capture and execute the compliance requirements identified
during the first three steps of our methodology.
3.4 CHINO Policy Modelling Elements
Following the methodology, once the business analysts define high-level compliance require-
ments (Step 3), the analysts and developers translate them into executable business processes
and privacy and security rules (Step 4). Overall, we adopt an artifact-centric process modelling
approach [137], where the definition of the process models has the objective to access and share
medical records. Such management has to be compliant with the policies identified at previ-
ous steps. To support this objective, the CHINO platform offers a set of technical features and
components that are grouped in the following set of elements: data, rules, Data Management
Interfaces (DMI), modelling elements and Low Level Operations (LLO).
The following subsections will detail each of these elements while Sections 5 and 6 will
show how their combination can achieve compliance-aware data management according to the
data management scenarios identified previously at Step 3.
3.4.1 Data
The establishment of a common understanding of terminologies of different policy adminis-
trative domains is key to interoperable data sharing [11, 93]. Our work is focused on the de-
velopment of a framework for the definition of compliant data management operations and
corresponding data sharing processes. We avoid forcing the use of particular message content
representation standard. Although HL7 [60] represents the de-facto standard for encoding and
exchanging healthcare data, other types of content (e.g. administrative and financial) need to be
encoded in different formats. An example of such scenario is shown in the Case Study 4.2 in
which organizations from social and health domain needed to exchange data.
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<Record>
<recordId>41</recordId>
<recordTimestamp>2012-07-12 T 15:00</recordTimestamp>
<recordType>22</recordType>
<recordDesc>ConsultationRequest</recordDesc>
<content>
<crRequesterId>1</crRequesterId>
<crRequesterName>John Watson</crRequesterName>
<crConsultantId>2</crConsultantId>
<crConsultantName>Jack Sheppard <crConsultantName>
<probDesc>Lorem ipsum dolor sit,
consectetut..</probDesc>
<pi>
<patientId>2900EG-8</patientId>
<name>Rose</name>
<surname>Ledama</surname>
<gender>F</gender>
<birthDate>1980-05-15</birthDate>
</pi>
</content>
</Record>
Figure 3.3: An instance of the ConsultationRequest XML record.
With CHINO we provide a platform to share any data format and we leave to the organiza-
tions to rely on the state of the art in the literature to address semantic interoperability at the
information model level.
To exchange data we propose a protocol based on IHE - Cross-Enterprise Document Sharing
(XDS) profile concepts [93]. XDS has been proved as effective to exchange medical records
in many projects [36, 143] and it has been adopted in our previous work in building an EHR
architecture in the Trentino region - Italy [11]. The protocol is described with more details in
Chapter 4 and in particular in Section 4.3.
To provide data discovery functionalities and to limit data sharing only to the data that is
relevant to the participant organizations, XDS introduces the distinction between two kind of
data that are called respectively metadata and records:
• Metadata (M): describes a record and is used to build the patient medical history. It
contains only the data necessary to identify a person (who), a description of what occurred
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(what), the date and time of occurrence (when) and the source of the event (where). M is
necessary to discover information about a patient and is stored centrally on the metadata
registry.
• Record (R): contains detailed and privacy sensitive information (i.e. the consultation re-
quest shown in Figure 3.3). Records can contain any type of content (healthcare, ad-
ministrative, financial) and can be stored centrally on the CHINO record store or kept
on external data stores. To ensure policies such as Safeguard and PIStorage, records that
are stored on the CHINO record store are encrypted. Although CHINO provides a central
record store, its main role can be seen as a broker for data management aspects. Due to the
existence of policies such as PrivateStore, it does not impose a centralized EHR manage-
ment system. However, as the current trends are demonstrating, centralized cloud-based
storage environments represent already one of the main cost saving strategies in healthcare
[184].
The data exchange protocol proposed by XDS shares first metadata and then, only upon explicit
requests, it shares records with interested data consumers. This approach limits the disclosure
of privacy sensitive information and the amount of transferred data since metadata contains only
a brief description of the corresponding record (see Section 4.3 for more details). To manage
authorizations and access rights to records and metadata, CHINO provides a set of rules that
data owners need to define for interested data consumers.
3.4.2 Rules
Rules are designed to implement a privacy preserving access control mechanism over metadata
and records. An appropriate definition of rules is key to enforcement of the policies related
to the access to data such as Consent, Purpose and Proportionality. To enforce all identified
policies, we identified and designed two types of rules: access rights and data filtering rules.
The access rights (Ar) rules define who can access a record or metadata while the data filtering
(Fr) rules are used to disclose only the information that is required to perform a specific task. In
particular, Fr is necessary to enforce the Proportionality policy, as we will show later. Overall,
the data sharing protocol uses Ar to check authorizations and Fr to ensure privacy-aware data
disclosure and in conjunction, these two types of rules implement a purpose-based access con-
trol mechanism. Access Rights Rules (Ar) ensure access control over metadata M and records
R. The design of Ar has been inspired by the Privacy-Aware Role-Based Access Control model
[135] that has been proposed as an extension of classical Role-Based Access Control models
introducing the concept of purpose of use of data. CHINO assigns to both institutions and in-
dividuals unique ids and associate explicit access rights to them based on the purpose of use of
data. The Access Right Policy Enforcement Point (APEP) applies the rules to requests of M and
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R (stored on the CHINO data store or on the organizations’ data stores). Access rights on R and
M can be defined on record types or single instances. If a rule is defined on a type for a specific
consumer (C) then it can access the entire set of records of that type (i.e. the governance can be
enabled to access to all R signaling a request for a specific service or appearing of a particular
disease). A C that is allowed to access to R can automatically access also M about the same
record type or instance. An Ar tuple has the following structure:
Ar = (Oid, Cid, Rt, Rid, crt, expt, Puid, FRid). (3.1)
while an instance of Ar tuple is shown here:
(1, 2,−, 41, 2013− 1− 1T14 : 01 : 01, 2013− 4− 3T14 : 01 : 01, consult., 324) (3.2)
where Oid is the owner id. Cid (2 in the example) is the authorized consumer id. Rt is the
R type that C is allowed to access. O can authorize C to access to R types or single instances
(i.e. Rid). As it is shown in the example, the access is authorized only for the record Rid=41
(the Rt value is null). If Rt is specified then Rid needs to be null. crt and expt are the creation
time and the expiration time of the Ar. Puid is the purpose of access that is allowed for that
specific Ar (consultation in this case). FRid (324) is the id of the filtering rule (detailed later)
that is applied to that Ar for the purpose consultation. FRid can be also null if no filtering
rules need to be applied for the specified purpose of use of data. Data Filtering Rules (Fr)
extend the access rights providing a fine-grained data filtering mechanism for XML or HL7
data [11]. Fr is defined by data owners and specifies who can access which parts of data for
which purpose (e.g. to deny personal identifiable information when a record is accessed for
business intelligence purpose). We use the XACML [124] language, an XML based standard,
to specify filtering rules. For more details about privacy policies see Chapter 4 and in particular
Section 4.4, while for a deeper analysis of access control aspects in data integration scenarios
see Chapter 5.
An example of policy (simplified for readability reasons) is shown in Figure 3.4 and has
been defined according to the record schema shown in Figure 3.3. According to the XACML
notation, a policy specifies which actions a certain subject can perform on a specific resource
while fulfilling some obligations (e.g. specific constrains) [135]. In CHINO, an action corre-
sponds to a purpose of use of data that is business intelligence (BI) in the example policy in
Figure 3.4. The set of obligations specifies which attributes the requester is allowed to access.
In the example due to privacy constrains only record creation time (crT), patient gender (pi/-
gender), birth date and birthplace are accessible. The Data Filtering Policy Enforcement Point
(FPEP) applies XACML rules on R and M requests. R that is stored on the CHINO record
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<Policy>
<Rule RuleId="324">
<ResourceMatch>ConsultationRequest</ResourceMatch>
<Actions>
<ActionMatch>BusinessIntelligence</ActionMatch>
</Actions>
<Obligations>
<Obbligation>
<AttributeId>recordTimestamp</AttributeId>
<AttributeId>pi/gender</AttributeId>
<AttributeId>pi/birthDate </AttributeId>
<AttributeId>pi/birthPlace </AttributeId>
</Obbligation>
</Obligations>
</Rule>
</Policy>
Figure 3.4: An example of XACML policy for the ConsultationRequest record type.
store is encrypted. To enforce filtering rules, the system needs to decrypt the records, apply
the policies and then re-encrypt them before sending to the requester. If the records are stored
on remote record stores, the policies can be applied at decentralized FPEP and then sent to the
destination through CHINO. The process based approach allows these different configurations
to be modelled and executed depending on data owner’s requirements. To access to data and
rules we identify a set of operations through which external applications interact with CHINO.
3.4.3 Data Management Interfaces (DMI)
The DMI has been defined to provide a set of CRUD (create, read, update and delete) operations
over data and rules. In particular we designed DMI to manage metadata, records and Ar rules.
The Fr rules need to be designed starting from the metadata and record content schema and thus
require specific user interfaces that are currently left as future work. However, in our previous
work we proposed a prototype implementation of the required graphical user interface [11]. The
identified DMI are listed in Table 3.2 along with their input and output parameters.
Following our methodology, at the Step 4, the DMI internal business logic needs to be
implemented through a business process. Next subsection describes the modelling elements
that CHINO modelling framework provides and it shows how they execute operations on data
and rules.
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DMI Description Input Output
PushRecord Encrypts and stores R on the record store. It re-
turns the generated unique
Rid. R Rid,
GetRecord Returns R if the request is authorized or a denied
status otherwise. It can return also a wait status
to signal pending-approval or an error message if
something went wrong during its execution.
Cid, Rid,
Puid
Respc, R
DeleteRecord Deletes the specified R from the record store. Rid Status
code.
PushMetadata StoresM on the metadata registry and returns the
generated unique.
Mid M Mid
SearchMetadata Returns M that matches the searching parame-
ters and that the requester is authorized to access
Search
params.
Array of
M
DeleteMetadata Deletes a M from the metadata registry. Mid Status
code.
AskForAR Sends a message to the R owner asks for access
rights for a R for a specified purpose.
Rid, Puid Status
code.
GrantRecordAR
and GrantMeta-
dataAR
Grant access rights to a consumer (Cid) for R or
M type or instance for a specified period of time
and a purpose (Puid). Optionally a filtering pol-
icy (FRid) can be specified.
Cid, R(M)t,
R(M)id,
expt, Puid,
FRid
Status
code.
RevokeRecordAR
and RevokeMeta-
dataAR
Revoke previously granted access rights to a con-
sumer (Cid) for R or M type or instance.
Cid, R(M)t,
R(M)id,
Puid
Status
code.
Table 3.2: List of identified DMI and their input and output parameters.
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Custom
Elements
Description Input Output
C1 Checks the hash (integrity) of a record. R True or False
C2 Sends a wait message to the requester OURL, Reqid,
Rid, Puid.
Status code.
C3 Sends the Request Denied answer to the re-
quester.
Reqid, Reason,
CURL.
Status code.
C4 Sends the Timeout answer for the call to the re-
quester.
Rid, CURL. Status code.
C5 Calls the AskForAR DMI. Oid, Cid, Rid,
Puid
Status code.
C6, C7 Grants Record and Medatada access rights call-
ing the corresponding LLO on APEP.
Cid, Rt, Rid,
expt, Puid, FRid
Status code.
C8 Sends a reminder message to the R owner OURL, Cid, Rid,
Puid.
Status code.
C9 Applies a filtering rule Fr on R. R, Oid, Puid Filtered R
C10, C11 Performs a call to LLO to check the AR for a
given consumer (Cid) and purpose (Puid)
Cid, Rid, Puid True or False
C12 Encrypts R Rid Status code.
C13 Customizable logging on internal or external au-
diting system.
Process state info Status code
C14 Saves M on metadata registry internal compo-
nents.
Mid, M Status code
C15 Saves R on record store or internal components. Rid, R Status code
C16 Decrypts R Rid R
C17 Sends the requested R to the requester. R, CURL Status code.
C18 Restore the requested M from metadata registry. Mid M
C19 Restore the requested R from record store. Rid R
C20 Waits for the approval of an access right request.
C21 Sends an error message to the requester. Reqid, Reason. Status code.
C22 Deletes M from metadata registry Mid Status code.
C23 Deletes R from record store Rid Status code.
Table 3.3: List of the CHINO custom modelling elements and their input and Output parameters.
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Figure 3.5: The CHINO custom modelling elements.
3.4.4 Modelling Elements
To provide a comprehensive set of elements and facilitate the business process modelling activ-
ity, the CHINO modelling framework borrows the whole set of standard BPMN 2.0 elements
[139] and in addition, it identifies a set of custom modelling elements that are shown in Figure
3.5 and detailed in Table 3.3.
BPMN has been preferred to other languages that provide visual representations due to its
maturity and flexibility. In particular, BPMN version 2.0 allows users to define orchestrations
among systems and people and many reference implementations of execution engines have been
proposed. To facilitate operations on data and rules through calls on the Low-Level Operations
(LLO), we introduce a set of custom elements. In addition to operations on data and rules, some
custom elements implement the DMI logic (i.e. send record or error messages to requesters).
These operations are performed in a transparent way to the analysts and developers that will
need simply to drag and drop and configure the elements. Process model examples implement-
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ing the GetRecord DMI are shown in Section 6. The set of custom elements has been defined
based on identified requirements and policies in Table 3.1. Thus it could happen that new el-
ements will be required to manage exceptional cases. In that case, BPMN standard elements
can be easily customized and added to the list of custom elements if considered as potentially
useful in future situations. The modelling elements access to internal components that manage
data and rules through a uniform set of interfaces called LLO
3.4.5 Low-Level Operations (LLO)
The identified operations on data and rules are called Low-Level Operations (LLO) and are
executed by the internal CHINO components. These components include the record store,
metadata registry, and policy enforcement points. As for the DMI, the set of LLO has been
defined based on the CRUD operations on data and rules that are performed by modelling
elements. Since LLO have been designed following the same approach as for the DMI reflecting
the custom modelling element operations, we do not list them here.
Next section will first explain the relation between policies and the DMI operations and
then it will show how the data, rules, DMI, LLO and modelling elements are used to enforce
the identified policies.
3.5 Policies and Policy Enforcement Templates
The Definition of Executable Processes and Policies step of the CHINO methodology starts
with the identification of the right sequence of calls to the DMI operations that respect the high-
level interaction requirements identified at Step 3. Namely, each step in Figure 3.1 can be seen
as one or many calls to DMI. For each DMI, business analysts need to identify which policies
need to be satisfied during its execution. Then, they need to define, through the combination of
data, rules, DMI, LLO and modelling elements, the DMI internal business logic in such a way
that it satisfies the identified policies. Such definition will result in compliant DMI business
logic and therefore in compliant data sharing among involved stakeholders.
To give guidelines and facilitate the process definition, we propose a set of process en-
forcement templates, each of them enforcing partially or totally some of the identified policies.
Before showing how the processes are defined with respect to identified policies and enforce-
ment templates, we show how doctor, specialist and patient interact in the doctor-consultation
scenario underlying how for each single interaction certain policies need to be enforced.
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3.5.1 Doctor-Consultation with CHINO
The sequence of message exchanges among actors involved in the doctor-consultation scenario
according to the OpenMRS and CHINO integration is shown in Figure 3.6. Here we focus on
the interaction steps while the architectural and integration details are shown later in Sections 7
and 8.
The sequence starts with the doctor filling the consultation request on his OpenMRS in-
stance and sending it to the specialist through the CHINO platform. This involves three op-
erations. (1) A record CR is generated and sent with a call of PushRecord(CR) operation.
(2) The corresponding instance of metadata CM is sent to CHINO metadata registry through
PushMetadata(CM ). (3) GrantRecordAR(CR, S, expt, consultation) grants access rights
to the specialist (S) to access CR for a period of time until expt for purpose consultation. (4)
The specialist will find the CM through a SearchMetadata(Ct) query where Ct is the consul-
tation request type. The searching can be done cyclically at fixed period of time or each time the
specialist logs into his system. The developed OpenMRS integration module implements the
later case. Then, (5) S asks and obtains the CR performing aGetRecord(S, CR, consultation).
To understand better the patient health status, at (6) the specialist asks for more patients’ data
requesting records r1, r2 and r3. Assuming S does not have Ar to access r2, then at (7) a
message AskForAccessRight(S, r2, consultation) is sent to the record data owner that in
this case corresponds to the patient. Currently the Ask For Access Rights custom element sends
an email with two links carrying the correlationid that will allow later CHINO to resume the
process. One link approves while the other denies the request. The patient at (8), clicking on
the approval link, performs a GrantRecordAR(r2, S, expt, consultation, correlationid) that
will grant the Ar for r2. At (9), finally, S will be able to access to r2 through a GetRecord(S,
r2, consultation). Once filled the consultation response, S sends the corresponding R and M
through steps (10), (11), (12). Finally (13) the doctor can get the response.
The overall sequence of steps allows the involved actors to exchange data through the iden-
tified set of DMI. We now analyse the relation between the DMI calls and the policies that need
to be enforced during their execution. We then propose a set of policy enforcement templates
that could be used to implement the DMI process models while enforcing each of the identified
policies.
3.5.2 DMI Policies
Once the business analysts have identified the right sequence of DMI calls for a scenario such
as doctor-consultation, the Definition of Executable Processes and Policies step is to identify
for each DMI operation the set of policies that need to be enforced during its execution. If we
consider the GetRecord operation, the set of policies includes Identification, Access, Purpose
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Figure 3.6: The sequence of steps carried out by the doctor, the patient and the specialist during the
doctor-consultation scenario.
and Proportionality. In other words, each time a record is requested, the requester needs to be
identified and the access to data needs to be authorized for the specified purpose. Finally, the
requester needs to obtain only the necessary data to perform the tasks related to the specified
purpose. Policies can be either extracted from regulations or the set of organization specific
requirements during the first 3 steps of our methodology.
The proposed methodology identifies the actors and the steps that need to be performed in
order to identify and formulate the exact set of policies that each DMI needs to enforce. During
our regulatory analysis we identified some state-of-the-art tools and methods that can be used
by business analysts during the policy identification to devise the set of policies affecting each
of the DMI’s [33, 143, 122, 159].
Following our approach, the policies are enforced with the appropriate implementation of
the DMI process models. It is important to note that some of the policies (e.g. Identification or
Safeguard) are satisfied by design with the appropriate design choices and implementation of
internal components (e.g. encryption strategy on record store). Therefore these policies are not
considered during process modelling but instead are they assumed to be supported by the data
management framework itself.
If an organization (i.e. its business analysts) can define for each DMI a process model that
enforces the identified policies, that organization is compliant with its regulations relatively
to the data management operations provided by the CHINO framework. Note that herein the
compliance refers to the data management operations while the whole regulatory compliance
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Figure 3.7: CHINO Logging Service custom modelling element sending logging messages to a specified
auditing system.
involves also other requirements not strictly related to data management, such as the establish-
ment of supervisory authority or other administrative obligations.
The definition of process models can represent a complex task. To facilitate the process
modelling activity and teach to users how to use the CHINO modelling framework, we provide
a set of policy enforcement templates that aim at helping users in defining compliant process
models.
3.5.3 Policy Enforcement Templates
To show how the identified policies are enforced within the CHINO framework we propose a set
of policy enforcement templates. These templates are reusable and specialized BPMN process
design patterns [175] that aim at providing a set of guidelines, best practices and teaching to
users how to enforce the identified policies using the CHINO modelling framework. In partic-
ular, these templates show the usage of CHINO modelling elements and how they interact with
internal components to achieve policy enforcement.
The next subsections will detail the identified templates describing for each of them the
policies it enforces (partially or totally), input and output parameters and the modelling elements
that need to be used.
Auditing
One of the most important requirements for achieving compliance in healthcare is represented
by the need for ensuring effective auditing strategies [159]. If an organization needs to feed
personal auditing systems, the Logging Service can be customized to format and forward the
audit messages to the external audit services. The audit message is composed using Groovy
Scripting language (groovy.codehaus.org) that is one of the scripting languages offered by the
BPMN engine.
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Figure 3.8: Template showing the usage of the Check Record Access Right CHINO custom modelling
element.
Figure 3.7 shows the Auditing template and the Logging Service usage. All the attributes
stored inside process space can be used as input parameters to compose the audit message. The
message can be either sent to external audit systems or logged internally calling the Log LLO. It
is important to note that the availability of the set of input parameters depends on the elements
that are executed before the Logging Service. For example immediately after the process starts,
only DMI Input parameters are available to compose audit message.
Check Access Rights
Security policies have as objective to ensure access control and secure data management (stor-
age and transfer). While policies such as Identification and Safeguard do not necessarily require
modelling elements to be enforced, the Access and Purpose policies are ensured by the Access
Right Policy Enforcement Point component.
Figure 3.8 shows the usage of the Check Record Access Right modelling element. It takes in
input the DMI parameters and returns either approve or reject response. It is shown in conjunc-
tion with a BPMN Exclusive Gateway to show how the output is used to take the appropriate
decision afterwards.
Ask for Approval
When the data owner is an external entity (e.g. patient), to enforce the Consent policy, the Ask
For Access Rights element needs to be used. To signal to the requester that the process is waiting
for the approval, a wait message needs to be sent as the DMI call response.
The template in Figure 3.9 shows parallel execution of the Ask For Access Right and the
Send Request Wait Message CHINO modelling elements to send an access request to the owner
and a wait message to the requester. The proposed template is usually followed by a sequence
of steps to wait for approval.
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Figure 3.9: Template showing how Ask For Access Rights should be paired with the Send Wait Message
to requester.
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Figure 3.10: Combination of CHINO custom and BPMN modelling elements to ask to an external data
owner to approve a record request.
Wait for Approval
The Ask for Approval template is usually followed by a sequence of steps that need to imple-
ment the waiting for approval logic. The waiting logic depends on the data owner requirements.
The template in Figure 3.10 uses the Wait Approval CHINO modelling element that takes
in input of the correlationid and the DMI input. The time to wait is used inside the BPMN
Boundary Timer element to trigger periodically the execution of Send Reminder to Owner ele-
ment. The output can be either a request approved, a request rejected or time-out response. The
given output needs to be sent later as the response to the data requester.
Retrieve Record
The Retrieve Record template shows the usage of the Get Record From Repository modelling
element that restores a record from a local or remote record store.
The template is shown in Figure 3.11 and is used to enforce the PrivateStore policy that
organizations (e.g. the one under Italian jurisdiction) can use to manage their records inside
their information systems while participating to CHINO sharing platform. The template takes
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Figure 3.11: Template showing Get Record From Repository element configuration to retrieve a record
from local or remote record store.
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Figure 3.12: CHINO custom modelling element applying filtering rules to delete unnecessary data for
the specified purpose.
in input being the DMI input parameters and returns the retrieved R.
Apply Filtering Rules
As already discussed in previous sections, the Proportionality policy is satisfied by applying
Fr inside the Apply Filtering Policies CHINO modelling element that calls the Policy Filtering
Enforcement Point internal component.
The enforcement template in Figure 3.12 shows the Apply Filtering Policies modelling ele-
ment usage. It takes in input being the DMI input parameters and the retrieved R. Once applied
Fr by calling the ApplyFr LLO, it returns the filtered R′ to the requester.
Return Response
Each DMI is an asynchronous operation. Once request data is transmitted to the DMI end-
points, the connection is terminated with an HTTP success status. While some calls (e.g.
GrantRecordAR) do not necessary require a response, for other DMI (e.g. GetRecord) the
response is mandatory. To reply to GetRecord operation, CHINO provides four types of re-
sponses implemented by corresponding custom modelling elements. Send Record to Requester,
Send Request Wait Message, Send Request Denied, Send Error Message are the elements that
need to be used to provide responses. Examples of these elements are shown in Figures 3.13
and 3.14 explained later.
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Exception Handling
BPMN offers a set of modelling elements (e.g. ErrorBoundaryEvent) that can be used to catch
exceptions at the process model level and implement the corresponding corrective logic. When
some exceptions (e.g. broken connection with remote store) are caught and proper actions taken,
a response signalling an error may be sent to the requester. In this case we provide the Send
Error Message modelling element part of the previously shown Return Response template. An
example of the usage of the Send Error Message element to signal to the requester that an error
happened is shown in Figure 3.14 at step i11.
Data Representation
Organization specific requirements are related to customization aspects and their enforcement
facilitates organization participation to EHR programs. For example organizations may want to
use existing systems that encode data in a proprietary format. In order to exchange data within
EHR programs and with other organizations they need to implement transcoding procedures.
To solve these challenges we do not propose a specific template but leave the suggestion that
within the BPMN Service Tasks transformations can be implemented to transcode data before
releasing it to third party. Java or Groovy languages can be used inside our framework to
perform such tasks.
Other templates
To enforce all security and privacy policies CHINO custom modelling elements play a central
role. With high level of customization offered by the CHINO modelling framework, different
entities can be identified and being involved in the policy granting right process (as shown by
the Ask for Approval template). When Ask for Approval is used properly in conjunction with
the Auditing template they are able to enforce the Accountability policy. In fact, accountability
is defined as ensuring the access and auditing of all operations over data. The Integrity policy is
achieved by verifying data integrity upon retrieval and transmission and using the Check Hash
custom CHINO element. The process-based approach is able to manage easily the exceptional
cases in which data subjects are under certain age or the records are about mental problems and
should not be disclosed to the subjects.
If the proposed set of custom modelling elements and templates is not sufficient to imple-
ment some special requirements and exceptional cases, the standard BPMN elements can be
used and extended with the help of system administrators.
With the presented templates we show how the identified policies in Section 2 are satisfied
through appropriate combination of modelling elements described in Section 4. Such templates
will be used later to compose the whole DMI process models.
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Figure 3.13: A business process implementing the GetRecord DMI according to UK regulations and
standards.
3.6 CHINO Process Definition and Execution
In Section 3.4 we identified the elements that characterize the CHINO modelling framework and
in Section 3.5 we clarified the relation between policies and DMI. Then we proposed the policy
enforcement templates that can be combined to enforce DMI policies and define compliant
processes. Here we show examples of such processes and how they are defined and executed
inside the CHINO process execution framework.
3.6.1 Process Definition
To show how process models can be defined through the combination of proposed templates
and other modelling elements we analyse the GetRecord operation implementation according
to the identified Italian and UK regulatory policies. It first needs to check access rights, retrieve
requested record from the repository and return it to the data requester.
As shown previously, some of the policies that the GetRecord needs to enforce are Identifi-
cation, Access, Purpose and Proportionality.
Figure 3.13 shows the GetRecord process model (a simplified version for readability rea-
sons) according to UK regulations while Figure 3.14 shows the process compliant with Italian
regulations and national-wide EHR architecture [143]. The processes show differences in the
use of modelling elements and policy enforcement templates due to different requirements.
Namely, both processes start with a BPMN Start Event element u1 and i1 respectively.
Then the Check Access Right template is used in both processes to authorize the request.
In Figure 3.13, the rule checking is followed by the Ask for Approval and Wait for Approval
templates that collectively enforce the UK Consent policy. In case of access right positive
48
CHAPTER 3. COMPLIANCE 3.6. CHINO PROCESS DEFINITION AND EXECUTION
Low-Level Operations (LLO)
Logging 
Service
i2 Logging 
Service
i14
Check Hash
i8
Send Record 
To Requester
i6Get Record 
From Repository
i9
Apply Filtering 
Rules
i11
Check Record 
Access Rights
i3
Send Request 
Denied
i12
Data Management Interfaces (DMI) 
i1
i4
i5
i13
i10
i15
Send Error 
Message
i7
Figure 3.14: A business process implementing GetRecord DMI according to Italian regulations and
standards.
result, the Retrieve Record template (elements u13 and i5) retrieves the requested record. It
restores the record from local record store in u13 or remote store at i5 as defined by the Italian
regulations, which is subject to the PrivateStore policy. The Return Response elements u15,
u16 and u17 and i11 are used to send the four type of return result for the GetRecord. Namely,
u15 returns the requested record, u16 the request denied response, u17 a time-out and finally
the i11 returns an error message. Since in both Italy and UK regulations the Proportionality
policy needs to be enforced, the Apply Filtering Rules template (elements u15 and i11) apply
the Fr before returning the filtered R to the requester.
As we shown with these examples, the combination of modelling elements, data, opera-
tions and rules provides a comprehensive set of constructs that can implement the DMI internal
business logic while enforcing identified policies.
3.6.2 Data Management Process Execution
The resulting CHINO process models are fully compliant with BPMN 2.0 processes where the
custom elements are BPMN Service Tasks. Service Tasks have been introduced to provide pow-
erful extension points using custom code (Java in our case) to perform custom actions (e.g.
calls of web services). This feature is offered by almost all BPMN engines that allow the im-
plementation of the Service Task business logic through programming language interfaces (i.e.
Java Interfaces). The CHINO custom elements are Service Tasks that have been modified in-
troducing a new look and feel, additional configuration parameters and a Java class for each of
them to implement the calls to the LLO and interaction with external systems. This BPMN cus-
tomization approach has multiple advantages. First, these extensions do not affect the process
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execution semantic and therefore there is no need for process engine modifications. Thus, the
CHINO processes can be easily ported to a different BPMN engine that supports Java language
and Service Task extensions. Secondly, modelling of such CHINO processes does not introduce
the need for specialized skills; instead it hides technical implementation details while allowing
users to fully customize the processes.
Before being deployed, the processes need to be manually verified in order to identify pos-
sible syntactic errors. Once verified, the processes are deployed and executed on the process
engine. The engine manages process persistence, their starting and ending, and concurrent ex-
ecution. An important aspect is related to the fault tolerance that includes exception handling,
process cancellation and process restoring in case of errors or system crashes. Exceptions that
are related to process model aspects can be caught by following the general guidelines proposed
by the Exception Handling template. Exceptions that are related to other errors such as system
crashes need to be managed by the system administrators. An administrator manual interven-
tion will be required to restore the correct process state and restart it. The process restarting and
roll-back procedure depends on the BPMN engine. The engine adopted by CHINO (detailed
later) does not provide automatic roll-back functionalities that would need to be implemented
additionally. Instead, it provides the access to the database and possibility to modify and update
process information and restart it.
One important aspect that is worth mentioning, but left as future work, is the detection of po-
tential policy conflicts. Policy conflicts are one of the major issues of policy-based approaches
in inter- and intra-organization collaboration scenarios. It has been widely studied and many
solutions for the conflict-aware policies and processes definition have been proposed [112].
Currently, we assume that policy conflict detection and resolution are done at design time. In
particular major conflicts could arise in case of wrong process definition. Namely, since orga-
nizations will need to define one process for each DMI, the conflicts could arise relatively to
the authorization aspects [112] if processes are not implemented correctly to grant the access
rights and retrieve records. For example, granting access rights and retrieving records need to
be defined in such a way that their combination results in a correct access right granting and
data sharing. These aspects are currently left as future work.
Next section shows more technical details about the CHINO prototype architecture and
implementation.
3.7 CHINO Architecture and Implementation
This section details the system architecture that supports the CHINO common execution frame-
work. We also present implementation details and describe how processes are defined and
deployed using the modelling framework.
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Figure 3.15: The conceptual architecture of the CHINO framework.
3.7.1 The Common Execution Framework
Following the CHINO methodology, once the processes and rules are defined (Step 4), they are
deployed and executed inside the shared execution environment (Step 5).
Figure 3.15 shows the CHINO conceptual architecture, which is based on the combination
of BPM and SOA/EDA architectural patterns, in order to provide clear separation between
business level logic and technical integration details [6, 68].
BPMN serves for modelling and executing business processes and orchestrating all the in-
volved actors (e.g. people, external systems and internal components). Service-Oriented (SOA)
and Event-Driven (EDA) architectural patterns and technological components (e.g. ESB) facil-
itate the creation of both synchronous and asynchronous APIs to interact with external entities
and internal components (e.g. DMI and LLO). These components are responsible for tech-
nical issues such as reliability, scalability, and communication with potentially heterogeneous
information systems using different communication protocols. The business-level integration
supported by the BPM framework deals with a higher level of integration by enforcing the
policies and requirements of each participant organization.
In Figure 3.15 the shared process execution framework is shown on the bottom left-hand
side. It executes and stores the business processes that perform calls on LLO and implement
the DMI business logic. Each organization has its own set of DMI processes that can be seen
as logically grouped and belonging to it and that are stored on the shared process repository.
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Process templates can be also shared among organizations enabling their reuse. If a process
satisfies the requirements of a new organization, from a template, a private copy of the process
can be created and customized. The process does not need to be modified if only access rights
and filtering rules need to be changed.
The set of internal IT components is shown at the bottom right-hand side. The core internal
components can include the data containers such as the shared Record Store that stores medical
records and the Metadata Registry that stores the metadata records. Then, the APEP manages
the access rights while FPEP applies fine-grained purpose-based data filtering rules.
The proposed architecture has been tested and validated with the development of the CHINO
prototype. The prototype and its integration with OpenMRS, demonstrate that the proposed ar-
chitecture efficiency is comparable with classical SOA architectures and design patterns [6]. In
particular, one aspect that is worth mentioning is the fact that the introduction of BPM tech-
nology at the internal logical integration layer does not introduce additional limitations. This is
possible due to the asynchronous definition of the DMIs to implement the messaging between
CHINO and participant organizations. In such way, the combination of SOA and EDA technolo-
gies enables the processes long-lasting execution without introducing additional challenges. As
next we show implementation details of the designed framework.
3.7.2 The Prototype Implementation
Building such a framework that supports the whole CHINO methodology and implements the
proposed architecture is a challenging task. The implementation provides a seamless integration
between all the framework components in order to address the general objective, that is, to pro-
vide a common execution framework that is able to orchestrate data sharing services, business
process management, heterogeneous communication protocols, data management components
and distribution of policy enforcement points.
As the shared process execution framework, we adopt Activiti BPMN, an open source
BPMN 2.0 process engine [2]. It offers a process designer plugin for the Eclipse IDE (eclipse.org)
and a process engine and repository that stores and executes the business processes deploy-
ments. In terms of runtime support, Activiti provides long-term persistence of processes and
concurrent process execution. It also provides the process correlation mechanism linking the
DMI calls with the appropriate running process instances using the correlationid that is carried
within messages. External systems interact with the deployed processes through calls of DMI
implemented by the underlying Enterprise Service Bus (ESB).
As the ESB we use an open source Java-based ESB called Mule [126]. Mule lies at the
heart of prototype implementation orchestrating all the frameworks’ components. It exposes all
the interfaces to external information systems, communicates with Activiti, and it hosts the data
management components exposing them through LLO. The ESB provides message persistence,
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Figure 3.16: A screenshot of the CHINO policy and process modelling framework based on the Activiti
process designer.
transaction management and many other technical features. Mule provides integration with
Activiti runtime through an embedded (Spring based) or standalone (REST) fashion [2].
The DMI and LLO are exposed as HTTP endpoints using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON),
a lightweight data exchange format [51]. A Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)
server ensures authentication for DMI calls. Mule ESB uses the Spring security framework
[162] to access to the authentication and security layer of LDAP. The underlying data model
is deployed on MySQL database (mysql.com) and it is used by all internal components (i.e.
Metadata Registry, Record Store, APEP, FPEP and Logs). As Metadata Registry we used an
instance of freebXML registry (ebxmlrr.sourceforge.net), a free and open source ebXML refer-
ence implementation [34]. It has been adopted in various projects and sponsored by different
institutions like IHE as the standard for metadata storage in healthcare [93]. ebXML Registry
is based on a flexible data model that can store any type of metadata. Record Store is built as
a map (Rid, Rcontent) where Rid is the key used to identify encrypted records (Rcontent). The
design choices of the scalable record store have been inspired by our previous work on record
management in cloud based environments. In particular we consider the work [108] as an en-
terprise level replacement for our Record Store that does not introduce delays or bottlenecks
when big quantities of data need to be managed centrally (for more details see [108]). Access
53
3.8. VALIDATION CHAPTER 3. COMPLIANCE
Right PEP has been designed to store the access right rules for records and metadata. The
operations on APEP are GrantAR that stores access rights, RevokeAR that revokes them, and
CheckAR that verifies if an Oid has required access rights to access an Rid. Data Filtering PEP
is implemented using the open-source project called Enterprise Java XACML Implementation
[66]. The validation of the FPEP component with real case filtering policies has been performed
within our previous work [9]. The development of user interfaces for the creation of policies
is left as future work, while FPEP component and ApplyFR LLO that perform calls on it have
been developed. As already shown, the technical details related to the access to the internal
CHINO components are hidden to the final users by using the custom modelling elements. This
simplifies the process definition and process understandability.
3.7.3 Process Definition and Deployment
The process-modelling and policy definition framework, as described by the methodology, in-
volves the collaboration of the business analysts and developers. With respect to modelling, we
extended the Activiti plugin for Eclipse IDE by adding the CHINO custom modelling elements.
Figure 3.16 shows the editor at work. The added custom elements (described in Table 3.3) are
present under the Extensions tab in Section C of Figure 3.16. Developers would need only to
input some configuration parameters in the Properties tab shown in Section D such as the URL
where the Logging Service will send the audit messages on the external auditing service. Pro-
cess modelling is performed in Section B. The process models are deployed on the engine using
Ant (apache.ant.org) deployment scripts accessible in Section A. Once deployed, the processes
become automatically executable to manage organizations data. The process management is
performed by the ESB that will dynamically start or resume the execution of the specific caller
organization. To link a process with an organization we use the ProcessKey which identifies
univocally a process model. Namely each process key is named as a pair of DMI name and Oid
(i.e. DMI-Oid). Once named and deployed the processes are automatically triggered by calls
to DMI performed by the identified organization.
To test the CHINO platform and the defined processes and policies we integrated it with
OpenMRS.
3.8 Validation
Here we report how we validated CHINO from different perspetives. First we validated its
technical ability to execute data sharing processes according to the identified requirements and
policies. Then we validated the CHINO modelling framework usability to verify if business
process modellers are able to define CHINO processes based on identified requirements. Fi-
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nally, together with privacy experts we analysed if and how CHINO can satisfy regulatory
requirements in the Italian legislation scenario.
We start by describing the first validation phase by integrating CHINO and the OpenMRS
system.
3.8.1 The OpenMRS Integration
To show how the CHINO system prototype achieves data sharing across multiple organizations
via the defined compliance-aware data management processes, we have conducted the integra-
tion between CHINO and an open source medical record system called OpenMRS [146], which
is used widely in the world. To test the interaction we developed an OpenMRS module for the
doctor-consultation scenario called ChinoOpenMRSModule. Then we developed two different
sets of processes and policies to simulate the configuration in which the specialist operates under
Italian legislation while the doctor is under UK legislation. Both OpenMRS instances rely on a
common CHINO policy execution environment deployed separately from these two OpenMRS
instances. The testing phase has demonstrated also that the innovative CHINO architecture
does not introduce any bottleneck or inefficiency if compared to more classical architectures.
The process execution in particular does not introduce significant overhead to the interactions
among client applications and CHINO.
The CHINO OpenMRS Module
The module has been developed according to OpenMRS guidelines and using Spring technol-
ogy [162].
Its conceptual architecture is shown in Figure 3.18. All messages exchanged between
CHINOpenMRSModule and CHINO, are encoded as JSON messages. The module performs
calls to the DMI through the WS Sender library that uses the Parser to create JSON messages
according to DMI interfaces. Then it receives the requested records and all other messages
through the WS Listener component. WS Listener has been implemented as a RESTful web
service to receive JSON messages. Once received, the component parses them using the Parser
and stores on OpenMRS internal DB. The OpenMRS data model has been extended to store
message content, their type and the id. This allows the module to check later if new messages
have been received. The Interceptor component is developed to catch records generated by
OpenMRS (e.g. new patient registration) and to send them to CHINO. In such way the records
and their metadata will form the patient medical history on CHINO and will be available for
future queries by other systems. A screenshot of the doctor consultation form used by the doctor
is shown in Figure 3.18. The specialist is provided with a similar UI to view the consultation
requests and provide responses.
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Figure 3.17: The conceptual architecture of the developed module.
Data Exchange in Doctor-Consultation
The simulation of the doctor-consultation scenario allows us to test the CHINO framework
and exchange data between the two instances. The doctor-consultation starts with the doc-
tor filling the form (shown in Figure 3.18) on his OpenMRS instance. When doctor press
the “Submit” button a consultation request CR is generated and sent to the CHINO platform.
The module, using the Parser, transforms it into a JSON message and sends it to CHINO us-
ing the WS Sender, which calls the PushRecord(CR) operation. The same sequence of steps
is done also for the other operation calls. When the specialist asks for the r2 performing a
GetRecord(r2) he receives a wait message as response. When patient approves the request
with the GrantRecordAR the process will be resumed and the record will be sent to the spe-
cialist’s WS Listener and saved on the database. The same sequence of steps will be performed
when specialist will send the response.
As a result, we can show that one organization on an OpenMRS instance can perform data
sharing with the organization on a different OpenMRS instance having different data manage-
ment requirements and policies.
The developed scenario shows typical interactions among patients, doctors and institutions
having different set of security and privacy requirements. We analysed the related regulations
and we provided a methodology that goes from requirement collection to definition of data
sharing processes and then to the their execution. With CHINO methodology and framework
we show how the identified challenges can be addressed and compliance-aware data sharing
supported.
We have shown that CHINO can support data exchange and interaction among medical
record systems according to defined processes and policies. Next section reports our analysis
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Figure 3.18: A screenshot of the consultation request form of the CHINO OpenMRS Module deployed
on OpenMRS.
with business process designer to test if they were able to model the CHINO processes according
to identified requirements.
3.8.2 Usability Validation
According to the CHINO methodology, Business Analysts and Developers should be able to
define the processes in compliance with the identified requirements by using the Modelling
Framework. To test these assumptions and the Modelling Framework usability, we performed a
user study with a group of nine developers that had preliminary knowledge about process mod-
elling with the standard BPMN Activiti Designer [2]. With the user study we tried to understand
if the requirements identified at Steps 1, 2 and 3 can be mapped into business processes at Step
4. The users where chosen among master students and employees of the University of Trento.
The analysis was based on notions from the Interaction Design (ID) studied in Human Com-
puter Interaction (HCI) discipline and applying the usability testing methodology called Think
Aloud [157].
According to it, the standard usability test is performed recording users performance on an
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assigned task. In our test we showed to users a document explaining the CHINO framework, an
data sharing scenario (e.g. doctor consultation) and a list of identified policies from Italian [94]
regulations. We monitored and stimulated them to speak while performing the assigned tasks
to analyse their behaviour. At the end of the test we asked them to fill a questionnaire about
overall satisfaction about the assigned tasks.
The objectives of this test were:
1. Understand if CHINO Modelling framework is easy to use and identify potential usability
limitations.
2. Evaluate if the Custom Tasks are easy to understand and to use and identify possible
improvements.
The Study
Prior to the main test we did a pre-test with two university employees to check if the provided
information and documentation was clear enough to complete the assigned tasks.
The pre-test gave us few important feedback to improve the main test. For example a user
pointed out that in the case of the Custom Task named Wait Approval, it was easy to understand
its meaning but difficult to understand how to use it and its behaviour. At the same time, the
other user raised some questions about the component Ask for Access Rights and its usage in
conjunction with the task Send Request Wait Message because of the ambiguity of the second
one as shown in the Template 3.10. To overcome these limitations we updated the documenta-
tion about Custom Tasks usage and performed the second test.
During the main test we asked some questions to users that had two types of responses. The
first one in a scale from 1 to 7 points where 1 correspond to negative opinion such as Strongly
Disagree and 7 to a positive judgement such as Strongly Agree. The second type was open
questions. All the numeric questions were mandatory while the open ones were optional. We
report some questions while the complete questionnaire can be found in [81].
Q1 “Overall, I am satisfied with the ease of completing the exercise in this sce-
nario.”
Q10 “I was able to complete the exercise quickly using this system.”
Q21 “This system has all the functions and capabilities I needed.”
Q23 “It was easy to understand the concepts introduced by this framework.”
Q25 “How do you rate the overall experience with the CHINO Modelling?”
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Results
To evaluate the responses for each question we calculated the mean (µn) and variance (σ2n).
According to our unit of measurement higher values are better, while lower variance is prefer-
able since the first coefficient expresses the positive or negative opinion of the users, while the
second represent the level of disagreement among them.
According to our analysis the test showed a positive impression about the tool usage after
few times it has been used. However, when users used it for the first time some differences
among opinions emerged. Only two users expressed a negative feedback about their perfor-
mance and usage of the modelling framework. However, since they were able to perform their
tasks, this does not represent an important limitation, although it suggests taking into consider-
ation different approach in the training of new user to CHINO for the first time.
Overall, from the test it emerges a good opinion about the modeller usability. Moreover the
open questions gave us some positive feedback:
“I am comfortable with the diagrams because it really represents the information
which is held on hospitals.”
And also some negative ones:
“The framework as I said is easy to use but anyway I had some problems of stability
during the usage, so for this reason, relatively to the question if I would recommend
this tool to others the real answer is yes, but...”
“The Activiti designer in general presents some problems like sometimes it freezes.”
The stability issues are related to the Activiti Designer and not to our specific extension but
it is just a matter of software maturity since Activiti team is releasing frequently new versions
of the Designer.
Overall, the User Study gave us important feedback about Custom Tasks usability and sug-
gested some improvements especially regarding the explanation of their usage. Other sugges-
tions include also the need for better explanation of usage of combinations of different tasks
to achieve a specific goal. Overall, tests showed a satisfactory usability level of the Modelling
Framework and demonstrated that users were able to transpose requirements into processes
while underlying the need for smaller improvements of the CHINO platform.
With these tests we validated the technical usability and feasibility of the CHINO approach,
while the next section analyses how CHINO components can contribute in achieving privacy
law compliance.
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Figure 3.19: CHINO Methodology with the focus on compliance inspections and verifications.
3.8.3 Privacy Law Compliance with CHINO
Here we analyse CHINO from the legal point of view by involving a privacy and compliance
expert. We reason about its ability to preserve privacy and data protection rights and to support
compliant processes definition. We try to answer in particular to the following two macro-
questions:
1. If CHINO provides all the technological elements (modeller, modelling elements, inter-
nal components) to support the development of privacy law compliant data management
processes and policies.
2. If CHINO could facilitate the tasks (emphasised in Figure 3.19) of process and policy
approvals or verifications that is done before going into production phase, and the legally
motivated inspections by Compliance Officers at runtime phase.
In order to answer to the first question we start by analysing the recommendations of the
Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party in [18, 15]. Working Party provides recommendations
on several topics emphasising the need for special safeguards in order to guarantee the data
protection rights of patients and individuals. Some of recommendations include the respect for
data subjects’ self-determination and authorisation procedures, security measures, transparency,
liability issues and finally, the availability of mechanisms to control the data processing.
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As described in the chapter, CHINO aims at providing an effective framework to support the
privacy by design approach that has been identified as one of main principles in the development
of systems that manage privacy sensitive data by the Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party in
the document The Future of Privacy [16] and by the European Commission’s proposal for a new
Data Protection Regulation [72]. Moreover, CHINO proposes a proactive approach based on
data self-determination in accordance to the privacy by design principles, providing effective
technical and organisational tools for healthcare institutions.
Analysing more deeply CHINO with the focus on data protection requirements, it appears
to be an appropriate platform for sharing personal and healthcare data also among organizations
that belong to different regulatory contexts [70]. From the data security point of view, CHINO
provides the necessary mechanisms to satisfy the security requirements related to healthcare
data management according to Art. 31 and 33ss of the Italian Data Protection Code [83] and to
the Privacy Impact Assessment [71] of the European Data Protection Regulation [72]. It imple-
ments technical and organisational features to avoid loss or unauthorised alteration, processing
and access to data. Furthermore it respects data protection general principles from the Direc-
tive 95/46/EC [69], and in particular the principles of purpose limitation, proportionality, data
quality, necessity and the data subject’s rights.
CHINO is able to enforce the explicit consent policy that is defined as the data subjects’
explicit consent on the processing of their data and it is an exemption to the general prohibition
to personal data processing, according to European legislation (Art. 8, Directive 95/46/EC)
[69, 17]. CHINO access right policies and the assurance mechanism enable data subjects to
freely express explicit, specific and informed consent about data sharing. According to the
legislation, in special cases data can be processed without consent (e.g. compliance with legal
obligations, protect vital interest of data subject, public interests). This is possible in CHINO
by defining special conditions on the Check Access Right modelling element. Processes can be
also defined to delegate the disclosure of data to data subjects’ personal doctors. Data subjects
could also delete and block data sharing according to the Italian legislation (see Art. 7, Italian
Data Protection Code [83]). Moreover the involved actors are able to receive notifications about
the process status, including the requests of access. The updates of wrong data to assure data
quality policy according to Italian, European and HIPAA legislations, are done through the Push
Record task.
According to European legislation (Art. 6 of Directive 95/46/EC [69]) and to the Art. 11
of Italian Data Protection Code [83], personal data can only be processed for specified explicit
and legitimate purposes and may not be processed further in a way incompatible with those
purposes. CHINO provides technical tools for enabling data controllers to check step-by-step
the lawfulness of the personal data process following the purpose principle [19]; the legitimate
purposes of the process are recorded and all the access requests are filtered according to them.
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CHINO provides mechanisms to release data only according to the specified, explicit and le-
gitimate purposes through the definition of filtering policies. Namely, the CHINO filtering task
provides anonymisation mechanisms to remove sensible information on a purpose-based ap-
proach. For example in case the data need to be used for statistical purposes, a filtering policy
that eliminate personal identifiable information can be defined [11, 164].
By analysing more deeply the data security features, CHINO guarantees confidentiality and
integrity of information against unauthorised access, disclosure or alterations. Moreover, it im-
proves personal data traceability, so that each communication and each data transaction can be
tracked back to a certain entity that can be easily audited. In order to assure data traceability,
CHINO provides features to clearly identify all the actors and entities involved in the process
execution. This allows identifying data controllers and data processors (and other involved en-
tities) when executing operations over data and addressing specific and defined liabilities to
data controllers and processors at any step of the processing. Logging ensures accountability
on operations over data in compliance with Articles 28ff of the Italian Data Protection Code
[83] and with the Guidelines on the EHR development [94]. CHINO allows data controllers
to keep privacy-sensitive data on their own servers if they have restrictions about data storage
administrative locations, as it is the case in Italy [94]. Regarding the data stored inside CHINO,
it is encrypted with standards algorithms (e.g. AES-128 and SHA-258 for hashing). The de-
ployment of CHINO could be done also in Cloud-based environments. Although this aspect
needs a deeper analysis, the combination of the possibility to decentralise record storage and
encryption techniques satisfy the requirements imposed by Art. 29 Working Party [15].
Relatively to the second question, we tried to analyse the healthcare software lifecycle that
is depicted in Fig. 5 with particular focus on the compliance aspects that have underlined
by two specific situations. Namely, the Figure 3.19 shows the situations where the “Chief
Compliance Officer”, that is usually a privacy expert or a Data Protection Officer, is involved
in the verification of the business processes developed at Step 5 and has the responsibility to
approve or reject them. The other situation is related to recent Inspection Plan [84] undertaken
by the Italian Data Protection Authority in which medical record systems has been included as
one of the potentially analysed systems. This means that the Data Protection Authority will seek
for documentation to check if the data lifecycle and data management procedures are compliant
with legislation in order to assure protection to data subjects’ rights. Both situations describe
tasks that could have significant potential impact on projects developed without considering
exhaustively privacy related aspects (i.e. fines to responsible organizations or, in extreme cases,
systems suspension or disposal).
In such direction, CHINO is able to facilitate inspection procedures due to its adoption
of BPM technology to define data management operations. Similarly to other scenarios and
context [29, 147, 152], visual representations in CHINO simplifies the process of revision by
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lawyer and privacy experts due to its simplification of understanding for people with non IT
background. CHINO expresses in a more clear way which privacy requirements are satisfied
when compared to standard textual documentation making easier to identify different steps and
related rights, duties and liabilities.
3.9 Lessons Learned and Discussion
Regulatory compliance is a complex goal for every organization that deals with sensitive data.
In healthcare, this is even more difficult since regulations and practices are complex and vary
from country to country as well as over time. The two regulatory contexts (Italy and UK) that
we analysed and the data exchange scenarios we identified motivate the need for a system that
is able to manage different privacy and security rules and orchestrate policy enforcement points
and data stores across different healthcare organizations that can potentially belong to different
regimes. To help organizations in identifying, defining and executing such regulatory and orga-
nization specific requirements, we proposed a new methodology and an execution environment
to:
• Capture the sequence of steps that need to be carried out by organizations to define their
own security and privacy policies and data sharing processes to conform to high-level
regulatory compliance requirements.
• Identify a set of elements, IT components and actors that can be orchestrated by data
sharing processes to achieve compliant data sharing.
• Provide an environment for the definition and execution of shared processes and policies
to support data, process and policy management.
The overall approach is based on a novel use and customization of business processes to model
the internal business logic of data management operations that allows involved actors to manage
and share data while achieving compliance. Processes serve as a vehicle to achieve high cus-
tomization of operations in such a way that each involved actor can satisfy its privacy, security
and business requirements. In particular, CHINO is able to execute data owners’ processes and
policies when their data is accessed by other organizations. In such way, while the organizations
are using the same set of interfaces to interact with CHINO, they execute policies and processes
of data owners and thus achieve a compliance-aware data sharing. It is important to clarify once
again that we tackle only technological aspects while data semantic is out of scope of this work.
Furthermore, the business process based approach allows us to better understand and share
our understanding of compliance requirements, and to reason about the process definition and
process improvements. The visual modelling of business process allows us to achieve better
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visibility and transparency on security and privacy rules. This can help at improving the trust
and compliance among the participant healthcare organizations in terms of data sharing.
From our experience, we observed that defining methods for sharing privacy sensitive data
is a multidisciplinary task that involves business, IT and privacy experts. The process-driven
approach could provide a vehicle for the involved actors to design, develop, verify and improve
more easily compliance policies.
CHINO can be seen as a general-purpose privacy-aware data management platform that can
be used also in other domains that are characterized by similar data sharing and accessibility
requirements.
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Architectures, Protocols and Policies for
Privacy-Aware Medical Record Sharing
This chapter describes how we tackled the challenges related to service integration in a socio-
health scenario and how we developed and validated a privacy-aware data sharing protocol,
underlying privacy policies and the supporting technology. These contributions have been in-
corporated within the previous chapter to support process execution and development of the
CHINO technology.
We start by showing how the lack of interoperability among agencies delivering care makes
the services (i) inefficient for the service providers, (ii) difficult to access for the citizens who
need to bring along paper-based records and (iii) hard to monitor and assess for the bodies in
charge of the governance.
We then describe the analysis approach to identify the data dependencies among institutions
(i.e. the data they produce, consume and need). To support data sharing we propose a privacy-
aware event-driven protocol and a system prototype. In the considered integration scenario the
protocol delivers the data to an Electronic Health and Social Record and a Business Intelligence
system. The proposed privacy policies provide a tight and incremental control on the access
and dissemination of sensitive information.
Before concluding, we report the validation phases including an on-field experimentation in
which an instance of the developed system has been deployed to integrate the social and health
services in the Trentino Province (Italy).
4.1 Introduction
In the last 30 years we have witnessed a considerable increase of life expectancy worldwide
[182] and consequently an increase of elderly population that, in many developed countries,
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is almost exceeding the number of people in working age, with serious economic and social
consequences. In Italy, as it is the case in rest of the Europe, large families are rare and single-
person families are becoming common, including families composed of an elderly person alone.
A common strategy adopted to reduce the public expenses to manage this phenomenon consists
in facilitating the autonomous and assisted life of elderly at their houses [160]. Long term
care of elderly (and, more in general, of fragile people of any age with physical and cognitive
disabilities) at home requires a breadth of services from sanitary and social domains.
In general the processes for applying and obtaining such services are fairly complex, since
they involve multiple private and public institutions that receive and process the requests, eval-
uate the applications and determine priorities and service levels, deliver the services, assess the
quality and cost of services delivered. The result is a complex cross-organisational process to
be executed each time a new service request arrives.
In this chapter we study the problem of privacy-aware integration of social and health ser-
vices and we show the solution we developed and how it has been applied to a set of use cases
in Trento (Italy). The use cases are extracted from a project undertaken by the Autonomous
Province of Trento that involves a dozen of institutions from the IT sector, the public adminis-
tration and the healthcare services.
We provide a solution to governmental bodies which are interested in facing two categories
of needs: Business Intelligence and partial automation of assistance services. Governmen-
tal bodies need Business Intelligence on the quantity and quality of the services delivered to
citizens, both to ensure that proper assistance is provided and to establish the amount of reim-
bursement due to the agencies providing the services. In absence of integration solutions, these
indicators are collected manually, sporadically, and with different practices at each institution
delivering services. In such cases governance spends considerable amount of time to compute
the indicators and the obtained results are often unreliable.
The second need is the partial automation of the cross-organisational assistance processes.
While the first objective is of interest mainly to the governance, the second is of interest to
citizens and institutions delivering care, as they aim at providing more efficient and reliable
assistance services.
From a technical and organisational perspective, the development of solutions for this kind
of problem is very challenging:
1. It departs from “traditional” data integration by requiring a process integration, with the
added complexities of being cross-organisational and characterised by a large number
of medium and small institutions that also dynamically grow over time (civic centres,
hospitals and social care institutions will need to progressively join the initiative);
2. Strict privacy rules defined by data protection legislations [83], guidelines for health
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records management [94] and proposed architectures at national level [143] forbid the
adoption of traditional data warehousing and integration approaches. Those rules forbid
collecting data in a central repository and define strict legal constraints on the way data is
collected, stored and distributed in a context with multiple organisations. Such constraints
make it difficult to identify application protocols and policies for such kind of integration.
Since the Italian Data Protection laws and Health Information Systems trends are similar
to many EU [69, 136] and non-EU [36, 76] countries, the problem is quite general.
In this chapter we report and discuss how we addressed and solved the identified challenges
and how we validated the developed solution on a set of real case studies. The following are the
main contributions of this chapter:
1. It shows how a data integration problem in a multi-organization and rapidly evolving
environment can be addressed via a process- and event-based approach which makes it
easy for new institutions to come on-board, minimises the development and maintenance
effort required for the integration, and - perhaps most importantly - blurs the distinction
between a data and a service integration, providing institutions with the benefits of both;
2. It describes how privacy and data sharing can coexist thanks to a protocol that meets
regulatory requirements via privacy policies defined by data sources. It restricts the access
to information only on-demand and supports the data sources in the definition of fine-
grained privacy policies constraining who can see what and for which purpose;
3. It presents the architecture and implementation of a solution that achieves integration of
health and welfare services that has been deployed in Trento, and discusses the many
lessons we have learned in doing this.
An instance of the proposed solution is now being rolled out in production after successful
experimentation with the involved institutions and the source code has been also released under
the GPL v3 free software license [77] and made available at the European Commission’s Joinup
repository [48].
In the following we begin by describing works done in related areas. In Section 4.2 we
describe the project context and goals. Section 4.3 describes the analysis approach we followed,
the system architecture and its main components. Section 4.4 details on privacy aspects while
Section 4.5 shows the testing of developed system with involved stakeholders. We discuss the
observed benefits of our approach and we conclude in Section 4.6.
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4.2 Motivating Scenario
In the Province of Trento, as in the rest of Italy and in many countries worldwide, the wel-
fare agency delivers a set of public services through many smaller agencies and municipalities
that do not share the same information systems; instead they have their own, sometimes self-
developed, custom software applications to satisfy their needs. To be reimbursed and to fulfil
agreement requirements imposed by the public sector, they need to send periodically account-
ing and statistical information to the central welfare agency. For the welfare agency, collecting
such information, carrying out refunds and obtaining visibility on the quality and the economy
of service delivery, requires collecting and integrating information from literally dozens of com-
pletely heterogeneous and fairly complex systems. Furthermore, the lack of coordination among
agencies and the complexity of assistance processes badly affect the quality of the services de-
livered as perceived by the patients with delays and lack of visibility on the progress of their
requests. In addition, the organisations waste time transferring information from paper-based
documents into their information systems with possibility of errors. Due to these inefficiencies,
the Province started a project that aims at addressing two main categories of needs:
1. The enabling of the organisations involved in social and health assistance to exchange in-
formation among their information systems and to create an Electronic Health and Social
Record (EHSR) for patients.
2. The automation of information gathering about Key Performance Indicators (KPI) and
cost metrics that are defined by the governance for the social and health services. A list of
these KPIs and metrics is provided in Table 4.1;
Figure 4.1 depicts the project scenario and the role of the infrastructure that we designed
and developed to satisfy project objectives.
The actors involved in the project scenario and their responsibilities can be classified using
the following categories according to the privacy regulations [94]:
• Data Subjects: citizens and patients to whom the data relates;
• Data Controllers: the Healthcare agency and socio-health service providers, the local mu-
nicipalities and groups of districts, private companies and organisations delivering tele-
assistance services, nursing home services and long term assistance in elderly houses or
recreation centres. They act as data producers and consumers as depicted in Fig 1 while
the Governance acts only as a data consumer;
• Data Processor: the developed system that acts as a data-sharing platform.
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Figure 4.1: The role of the developed system including the data sharing components, the Electronic
Health and Social Record (EHSR) and Business Intelligence (BI) services.
Due to the complexity of the scenario, the project considered only a subset of four assistance
processes while the entire set of health and social services is more than a hundred subdivided in
different areas [144]. The selected services are listed below:
1. Assistive and healthcare services for elderly with disabilities delivered directly at home
with the help of nurses, family doctors, social workers and private cooperatives delivering
meals and house cleaning services;
2. Long term healthcare services in specialised structures (e.g. rest homes);
3. Recreation centres for elderly people providing transportation, daily activities and meals
supply;
4. Tele-assistance services with a 24h call centre checking periodically the state of the as-
sisted person and reacting to critical problems (e.g. emergency calls from the user).
Given such incremental approach, one of the main identified requirements that a system
needs to tackle is facilitating the joining phase of other institutions to the initial group after the
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Involved Organisations Requested KPIs
Province of Trento: collects information on the services
delivered to monitor their quality, resources, reimburse-
ments and budget planning. Demographic evolution per
age classes;
# of assistance requests per district.
Welfare agency: evaluates cognitive and social state of
the patients to complete the requests of activation of socio-
assistive services.
# of patient per social workers;
% of accepted requests;
# of requests per territory area.
Healthcare agency: evaluates health state of the patients
to complete the requests of activation of socio-assistive ser-
vices.
# of requests of assistance by re-
questors (general practitioners, hospi-
tal doctors, social workers)
Local municipalities and districts: manage the admin-
istrative procedures and activation of the socio-assistive
services, financial support and delegation of service pro-
visioning to accredited organisations.
Average cost of services per person;
# of administrative practices completed
within 60 days.
Private companies and no-profit organisations (e.g.
tele-assistance), nursing home services, long term assis-
tance in elderly houses, recreation centres: deliver the
final services to the patients and interact with their family
doctors, relatives.
# of alarms per type (healthcare/ social
alarm, monitoring device failures);
# of hours of services per patient.
Table 4.1: A subset of KPIs the organisations are interested in.
first pilot, since not all participant organizations were involved. This is particularly challenging
as the systems used in each organisation are very heterogeneous with solutions implemented
both in-house by dedicated IT departments or acquired by third party IT companies.
Solving this heterogeneity by adopting one single solution would have the advantage of
improving the homogeneity in procedures and nomenclatures as well as facilitating communi-
cation. However, it would introduce the drawbacks of imposing a generic system that cannot
reflect all the specificities of single districts and organizations, and it would disrupt the current
political and organizational configuration. For these reasons, there is the need for a conservative
approach to preserve the systems currently in use.
Regarding the collection of KPIs, Table 4.1 gives some examples used for budget planning
and monitoring of the service quality. They are also used to monitor the service provisioning
and its compliance with the quality of service constraints defined by the Province (e.g. the
elapsed time from the approval of tele-assistance service request until its activation cannot be
longer than 7 days).
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Collecting such KPIs is challenging since they are intimately process-related, although the
underlying business process is very often poorly stated and defined. In fact, the indicators relate
to specific events of single assistance processes - i.e. they can be calculated by tracking what
happened and by discovering relationships amongst the events. To discover such events, it is
not reasonable and feasible to fully analyse the assistance processes: they have an intrinsic
and necessarily “unstructured” behaviour, owing to the managed services, which depend on
human decisions and evaluations. In these cases, the traditional data warehouse approach does
not work; it is already lengthy and hard to integrate a few systems in a single organisation, let
alone integrate dozens of them that are developed and managed by different institutions and that
execute unstructured assistance processes.
Next section describes how we approached the development of the system to tackle this
scenario starting from the analysis phase and then describes the data that are exchanged and the
event-based architecture we developed to tackle the specific project requirements.
4.3 Event-driven Architecture for Privacy-Aware Data Sharing
The case study described above is representative of a class of problems requiring data and
process integration while preserving privacy. A common approach in data integration starts,
naturally, from the data itself. However, our experience in the healthcare domain is that this
is hard to do for several reasons. Namely, the challenges are both technical and organisational
and are related to the domain complexity of social and health services and heterogeneity of the
involved institutions:
1. The service providers have heterogeneous IT systems having large and complex databases;
2. The IT departments of the involved institutions are sometimes not adequately staffed;
3. The integration is related to the processes that generate the data, not only to the data itself.
For these reasons, the methodological approach we follow is to tackle integration by analysing
and focusing only on assistance processes of interest and by identifying, with the relevant stake-
holders, the points in the process at which they need to inform other institutions about an event
(and related information) of interest that occurred during the process.
To identify processes and events of interest, one of the challenges consists in keeping the
stakeholders focused in a short-term joint effort as they may have different expectations and
backgrounds ranging from sociology, medicine, and financial management to IT. Their involve-
ment is crucial for projects success since the assistance processes are not documented and most
of the times they are only in the people’s mind. For these reasons, before showing how we
tackle the technological challenges and the technology we developed, we start by describing
the analysis approach we propose.
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Figure 4.2: An example of activity diagram with focus on events generated and documents exchanged
among service providers.
4.3.1 Process-Oriented Analysis
The analysis approach we propose focuses on the workers-application interaction in order to
capture the data produced at each step with the twofold goal of:
1. Isolating the points of cooperation and interoperability among the inter-related portions
of assistance processes executed by the parties - i.e. developing a common domain of
accepted concepts, shared amongst the organizations and the actors;
2. Identifying data of interest that could be used for feeding the Electronic Health and Social
Record (EHSR) or the Business Intelligence (BI) modules. While the BI needs to collect
data to provide a comprehensive analysis of the business processes occurring among the
parties, the EHSR needs to collect data for building the patients’ socio-health medical
history.
The approach is inspired by collaborative analysis and task oriented analysis techniques
[127, 173] that as opposed to other methodologies such as ethnographic methodology [32]
which requires considerable amount of time to complete the analysis, allowed us to gather a
concise representation of the integration scenario by involving the domain experts. The outcome
can be given to IT designers and analysts to gather the set of requirements, prioritise and rapidly
translate them into system specifications.
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To facilitate the analysis we represent the assistance processes and generated events graph-
ically by adopting activity diagrams. A simplified example is shown in Figure 4.2 while an
example from the case study is shown in Section 4.5.
We chose activity diagrams for their simplicity and understandability [62, 153] but also other
modelling formalisms could be used such as Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN)
[139]. We add to the standard notation some stereotypes to represent the data (both on paper
and in electronic forms) that are produced during each activity. In Figure 4.2 rounded white
boxes represent information generated inside IT systems (E1, E2, E3, E4, E5) while squared
white boxes (D1 and D2) represent documents exchanged between the two organisations.
With this approach we identified the information of interest for the interoperability and the
BI in form of events. Intuitively, an event is the occurrence of a change in a system and it
contains contextual information like the author, the data subject, the reason (i.e. the type of the
event), timestamp, and a payload representing what happened (e.g. the Rest Home Request).
In such way we could omit further analysis of sources’ information systems such as database
schemas or the technology. This approach instead allowed us to deal with assistance processes
which are not well defined and documented and may have many exceptions. For example they
may start from a social worker but also from the medical staff and each sub-process can end at
any point in time (e.g. for rejection of the request or death).
In Section 4.5 we report a detailed description of the steps we followed in our case study and
we show an example of a diagram for one of the analysed assistance scenarios. We show how
the process-oriented analysis supported by visual representations involved the actors during the
group meetings making them proactive during the definition of activity diagrams and the content
of each event.
Next subsections show the data sharing protocol and the system architecture that we de-
signed and implemented to share the identified events.
4.3.2 Data and the Data Sharing Protocol
The identified set of legal [83, 94], technological [143] and organisational requirements that
need to be satisfied relatively to the class of problem we aim at solving, as demonstrated by the
case study, are:
1. The minimisation of the commitment of the institutions to join the infrastructure facili-
tating the exchange of information and minimising at the same time the traffic (that is,
ensure that institutions get information on an as need basis);
2. Avoid duplication of sensitive data outside the boundaries of the data controllers;
3. Ensure that sensitive information is delivered only upon data producers provided autho-
rizations for stated purpose of use;
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<Metadata>
<eventId>1231321</eventId>
<senderId>345</senderId>
<senderDesc>Soc. Ass. Service</senderDesc>
<receiverId>5463</receiverId>
<receiverDesc>Health. Service</receiverDesc>
<name>Mario</name>
<surname>Rossi</surname>
<birthDate>1918-07-23</birthDate>
<SSN>MRIRSS18L23233Z</SSN>
<timestamp>2014-10-30 T 11:25</timestamp>
<recordType>55</recordType>
<recordDesc>RestHomeReq</recordDesc>
</Metadata>
Figure 4.3: An example of metadata message for the Rest Home Request Service.
4. Inform involved parties about information availability that is potentially of their interest
(without disclosing confidential information), so that they can then explicitly ask for the
confidential information by specifying also the purpose of use.
To tackle these objectives, we designed two kinds of data (inspired by EHR guidelines [143]
and international standards such as IHE - Cross-Enterprise Document Sharing (XDS) profile
concepts [93]) that are characterised by different levels of sensitiveness:
• Metadata describes a record and is used to signal that some event has occurred in a legacy
system. Metadata contains only information on the context in which the event occurred
such as: the data subject (patient/citizen); what happened (type of event, assistance ser-
vice); when; who generated that information (the data producer organisation and its sys-
tem), and potentially to whom should be delivered;
• Record contains all the data to fully characterise the event that, by default, should be kept
secret and shared only upon explicit authorisation of the data producer. It contains detailed
and privacy sensitive information (e.g. the Rest Home Request shown in Figure 4.4). A
record can contain any type of content (healthcare, administrative, financial).
Examples of metadata and record (simplified for readability reasons) that are generated at step
“Fill Request Form” in Figure 4.2 (corresponding to event E2) and are included (i.e. printed)
into the document D1 are shown in Figure 4.4.
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<Record>
<recordId>23</recordId>
<recordTimestamp>2014-10-30 T 11:25</recordTimestamp>
<recordType>55</recordType>
<recordDesc>RestHomeReq</recordDesc>
<content>
<socialStatus>Autonomous</socialStatus>
<economCoeff>2.3</economCoeff>
<partcicipCoeff>0.6</participCoeff>
<probDesc>The requester is autonomous
from cognitive and psychological point
of view. The physical state is normal.
</probDesc>
......
......
</content>
</Record>
Figure 4.4: An example of record message for the Rest Home Request Service.
The establishment of a common understanding of terminologies among involved organi-
sations is key to interoperable data sharing [93]. For this reason we define the structure and
semantic meaning of the metadata and the structure and envelope of the record message. How-
ever, to enable the record message to encapsulate and transport any type of data, we do not
define its internal structure and therefore also the semantic meaning. Although HL7 [60] repre-
sents the de-facto standard for encoding and exchanging healthcare data, other types of content
(e.g. administrative and financial) need to be encoded in different formats. Therefore, as shown
in Figure 4.3 and 4.4, we adopt XML as the encoding language of records and we define the
tag <content> of type any object to deal with different contents varying from message to mes-
sage. This approach gives the possibility to organisations to exchange any XML object without
changing the record retrieval operation interface (API). The tag <recordType> allows the data
consumers and the data processor to know the type of exchanged record and parse its con-
tent (e.g. to apply privacy policies and filter unnecessary data for specific data requests). An
XML schema [176] is associated to each of the record content types and it is shared among the
parties. This approach leaves to the involved organisations, or to a responsible governmental
body, the task to address semantic interoperability at the information model level by defining
the record content structures and semantic meaning. In case other data representations will be
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Figure 4.5: The sequence of steps to achieve data sharing among data producers and consumers.
introduced, the only modification will be needed to the Visibility Rule Manager (detailed later),
which applies filtering policies based on the content of records.
Data-sharing Protocol
To exchange metadata and records we extend the concepts proposed by the IHE - Cross-
Enterprise Document Sharing (XDS) profile [93] by introducing privacy-awareness given by the
filtering policies and by making it event-driven. Although the XDS protocol has been proved
as effective to exchange medical records in many projects [143, 36], it lacks a fine-grained
filtering of data based on the purpose of use (e.g. BI or healthcare assistance). Namely, in
contexts characterised by a high heterogeneity of data, as it is in our case study, delivering the
appropriate set of data for specific purposes should be faced at infrastructure level (i.e. before
delivering data to the BI module). Therefore we define a protocol that adds filtering of data at
sub-document level, in addition to a two-phase incremental sharing of metadata and records, to
achieve privacy-aware data sharing. The overall sequence of operations that data producers and
consumers need to perform in order to establish data sharing is described by the sequence of
steps shown in Figure 4.5.
After the producer has generated the record (i.e. an event in Figure 4.2), it saves it on its
internal record store (Step 1 in Figure 4.5) and sends related metadata by notifying the central
data processor (Step 2). The data processor delivers the metadata to all the interested consumers
that have subscribed to receive that specific event type via a publish/subscribe mechanism man-
aged by the Service Bus (detailed in the next subsection). If the receiver field has been specified,
then the message is sent just to that specific consumer and, in case it is of statistical interest,
to the BI module. The Service Bus forwards also a copy of the message to the EHSR that is
subscribed to all events by default. This approach decouples producers and consumers enabling
the later to subscribe to events of interest based on their needs.
When the data consumer receives metadata, it can ask for record content calling the Ge-
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Figure 4.6: The sequence of steps to achieve data sharing among data producers and consumers by
applying policies at data producer side.
tRecord web service operation. To fulfil the request, the consumer will be asked to specify the
purpose of use of data. The record will be restored from the producer record store and it will
be filtered by applying filtering polices according to the purpose of use declared by the data
consumer. To apply such policies, the data processor implements an XACML compliant Policy
Enforcement Point [124] (detailed later). Finally the data will be forwarded to the consumer
through the data processor.
Although the proposed approach has been successfully tested and validated, the filtering
of records can be slightly modified to achieve even a higher level of computation distribution
and end-to-end security if needed. Such modification to achieve a decentralised enforcement is
shown in Figure 4.6.
In Figure 4.6 the data processor forwards the record request at Step 6 along with the filtering
policy that needs to be applied. The data producer applies by itself the filtering policy (Step 7)
and returns the filtered record to the processor at Step 8, which forwards it to the consumer.
This solution improves the privacy and security since the processor does not need to access to
the record content. Namely, producers could add additional security to the data sharing with
consumers by for example encrypting records with public keys of consumers [75]. It also de-
centralises part of the computation to producers’ data centres, which applies filtering policies.
This scenario becomes particularly relevant to define responsibilities about managing access
to data but it adds technological complexity as a drawback. This is due to the need of decou-
pling the XACML components that applies policies (Enforcement, Decision and Information
Points) from the one that manage policy persistence (Retrieval Point) [124]. Although this so-
lution increases the level of privacy and security, for practical reasons related with the project
management, the system prototype has been developed and tested according to the scenario in
Figure 4.5.
Overall, the data sharing protocol (described by both approaches in Figure 4.5 and Figure
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Figure 4.7: The system architecture composed by Data Sharing Components, Applications and Services
and Local Wrappers residing on data controllers data centres.
4.6), limits the disclosure of privacy sensitive information and the amount of transferred data
since metadata contains only a brief description of the records and the records are kept inside
the data producer data centres by avoiding data duplication outside data producers administra-
tive boundaries and in compliance with data protection laws [83, 94] and guidelines for EHR
development [143].
To enforce the data-sharing protocol and respect all the other organisational and technolog-
ical requirements, we designed and developed a system prototype.
4.3.3 The System Architecture
The previously described protocol is enforced by a distributed architecture based on event-
driven and service-oriented architectural patterns in which sensitive data (i.e. records) is main-
tained at the sources while the central data processor stores only data references (i.e. metadata).
In such scenario the data processor mediates the communication among all the parties and acts
as a bridge for the routing and distribution of the data and requests. The system architecture
that has been designed to support such protocol is sketched in Figure 4.7.
The set of Data Sharing Components provides the basic functionalities for data publishing,
discovering and sharing. The Electronic Health and Social Record and Business Intelligence
modules are considered as specific “vertical” services laying on the Data Sharing Components
and consuming data. To facilitate the joining phase, the platform provides data controllers with
a Local Wrapper, which stores sensitive data and allows easy retrieval upon requests.
Data Sharing Components
Service Registry stores the contracts, Service Level Agreements (SLA) and other formal
and legal documentation that organisations need to sign when joining the platform. Similarly
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to other projects that aim at interconnecting public administrations [58], the registry is a plain
repository of documentation.
Event Marketplace provides a list of all available event types and their description files
such as XML schemas [176] and documentation describing the semantic aspects of the records
content. Participant organisations, based on other organisations’ or BI needs, publish on the
Event Marketplace the list of events they are able to share. Organisations can explore the Event
Marketplace and subscribe to the events of interest. A prototype demonstration of how the
Event Marketplace operates can be found here [11, 12].
Visibility Rule Manager stores the filtering policies and implements the Policy Enforce-
ment Point (PEP) [124], which applies them on record requests. Data producers define filtering
policies by using the Visibility Rule Manager (detailed later in Section 4.4), which allow them
to control the data disclosure to the specific consumers and purpose of access to data. The pur-
pose taxonomy for the health domain is well defined at national level [83] and purpose-based
access control has been preferred to role-based access control mechanisms due to role explosion
issues in multi organisation settings [135]. The PEP is implemented by using XACML [124]
policy specification language in which obligations are purpose of access to data. The XACML
engine is an instance of an open-source implementation of the XACML 2.0 version [66]. In the
scenario shown in Figure 4.6, part of the PEP has been placed also inside the Local Wrappers
under the responsibility of data controllers. This version decouples part of the Policy Enforce-
ment, Decision and Information Points that are deployed on the data controller side, from the
Policy Retrieval Point that is deployed on data processor side [124]. Data processor still acts
partially as the Enforcement Point since it receives all the requests that are transferred to the
producers.
Service Bus is an instance of the ServiceMix Enterprise Service Bus [8] and implements the
operations (APIs) toward the external applications to publish metadata and request records. It
acts as the glue component by orchestrating the interaction with other internal components and
vertical services that are subscribed to events. Since ServiceMix does not offer reliable message
persistence by default, we developed an extension, which provides a persistence module that
saves temporarily the data in cases when destinations are unreachable. Afterwards, it tries
repeatedly to re-send data using the exponential backoff algorithm [92] until it succeeds. This
improves the robustness and reliability of the system.
The list of APIs exposed to external organisations (including the Local Wrapper) is shown
in Table 4.2.
The Notify API is implemented according to WS-Notification standard [138] that encapsu-
lates messages in a specific SOAP header [177]. WS-Notification is supported by default by
ServiceMix and provides a publish/subscribe mechanism that is more interoperable than other
event-driven standards such as Java Messaging Service (JMS), which is tied with Java program-
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API Description Input Output
Notify Sends (publish) metadata on the registry and
returns the generated unique metadataid
metadata metadataid
GetRecord Returns the requested record upon applying
the filtering policy according to the specified
purpose of use.
recordid,
requsterid,
purpose
record
DeleteMetadata Deletes the metadata corresponding to the
specified metadataid from the Event Index.
The deletion is logical (and not physical) and
the metadata status can be restored back.
metadataid statuscode
SearchMetadata Returns metadata that matches the searching
parameters and that the requester is autho-
rised to access.
search
parameters
list of
metadata
Table 4.2: The list of APIs offered by the central data processor.
ming language. The security aspects are tackled at communication channel level by adopting
RSA public-key encryption schema [75]. All the activities performed by the data processor are
logged to support audit activities.
Local Wrapper
Medical data requires very long retention period, as it should be granted accessibility for
the whole patients’ lifetime plus a fixed number of years depending on regulations [83]. To
facilitate data controllers on achieving such requirements and facilitating the connection with
the central platform, we provided a wrapper module with a local record repository. Besides
helping them in storing a copy of the records, the Local Wrapper:
• Facilitates data controllers in joining the infrastructure as the whole communication pro-
tocol (e.g. WS-Notification standard) is managed by the Wrapper;
• Keeps an exact copy of the record eliminating the need to reconstruct it when requested.
This reduces drastically the impact on the existing source systems.
The two APIs that the Local Wrapper provides are detailed in Table 4.3.
The data received with the Notify operation are stored on a local temporal database. To read
the received data, the organisations will need either to change the saving procedure redirecting
data into their own database or implement interceptors at the database level.
Applications and Services
The Data Sharing Components serve as enabling factor for different potential vertical appli-
cations and services. In particular we have developed the EHSR and the BI modules.
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API Description Input Output
Notify Receives metadata from the data processor
and save them on a local temporal database
table.
metadata status
GetRecord Retrieves the record from the Record Store
and returns it to the data processor.
recordid record
Table 4.3: The list of APIs offered by the Local Wrapper.
Electronic Health and Social Record (EHSR) is represented and implemented by the
Event Index that stores the copies of metadata forwarded by the Bus. The Event Index keeps
all the event history and provides the basis for an EHR according to Italian guidelines [143].
The guidelines suggest using the ebXML Registry standard that has been adopted by different
standards such as IHE [93]. We chose in particular freebXML [78], an open-source reference
implementation of ebXML Registry 3.0 standard. Metadata on the Registry are never deleted
but instead only marked as deprecated. This design choice provides tractability of actions over
patients’ medical history.
Business Intelligence (BI) module represents a data consumer and receives metadata and
filtered (anonymised) records that are stored in a Staging Area. After applying extract, trans-
form, and load (ETL) transformations, it saves the data in a Data Warehouse (DWH). An in-
stance of an open source BI framework named SpagoBI [65] produces reports based on the
defined KPIs for final users.
The new BI approach that is fed by the developed system and that provides reports over each
single service delivered by the plethora of involved organisations is shown in Figure 4.8. This
approach reduces the effort for Governance to collect and integrate all the data extracted from
single sources as it was done before.
Next section describes how the records are filtered before the delivery to the data consumers.
4.4 Incremental Privacy on Events
Here we describe how data producers define which sensitive information consumers are entitled
to access by defined fine-grained filtering policies on the records and based on the purposes of
access. For example, in Figure 4.2, the doctor should be able to access all the fields of the record
Rest Home Request that are necessary for providing assistance (HealthcareTreatment purpose),
while he/she does not need to access to the fields that indicate the economical status of the
patients (econCoeff on the record example in Figure 4.4). Figure 4.9 shows an example of such
policy.
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Figure 4.8: The real-time Business Intelligence approach fed by the event-driven architecture.
Figure 4.9 An example of XACML policy defined on the Rest Home Request record for
the purpose Healthcare Treatment. The policies are specified using the XACML standard [124]
and are defined following the national data protection regulations, which define taxonomies
of purposes of use of data [94]. The policy example defines the list of fields (inside the tag
Obligations) that can be accessed for purpose HealthcareTreatment (inside the tag Actions).
In particular, it disallows the access to fields econCoeff and participCoeff that indicate the
economical situation of the service requester and that are not needed by the doctor for healthcare
assistance purpose.
As shown in “The Data-sharing Protocol”, we propose two alternative implementations for
the enforcement of the privacy policies: centralised enforcement and decentralised enforce-
ment. In the centralised enforcement privacy policies are applied by the data processor on the
records retrieved by the data controller. This approach relieves the data controller from dealing
with the enforcement of the privacy policies but it is less privacy-safe. The records transferred
from the data controller to the data processor contain the sensitive data that is filtered before
forwarded to the requestors. Even if the data processor does not persist the data more than the
time necessary to apply the policies, there is the potential risk that unfiltered data is intercepted
increasing the probability of violations. Furthermore this approach assigns to the data processor
the responsibility of granting the correct application of the privacy policies and makes it liable
in case of privacy leaks. In some cases, the data processor cannot take charge of such respon-
sibility, and the potential risk of privacy violations could make the approach not completely
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<Policy ... targetnamespace>
<Rule RuleId="RestHomeReqPolicy" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Subjects><Subject>
<SubjectMatch MatchId="...string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="...string">Doctor</AttributeValue>
<SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="...role"
DataType="...string"/>
</SubjectMatch>
</Subject></Subjects>
<Resources><Resource>
<ResourceMatch MatchId="...string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="... ">RestHomeRequest</AttributeValue>
<ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="...resource-id"
DataType="...string"/>
</ResourceMatch>
</Resource></Resources>
<Actions><Action>
<AttributeValue
DataType="...string">HealthcareTreatment</AttributeValue>
<ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="...action-id"
DataType="...string"/>
</ActionMatch>
</Action></Actions>
</Target>
</Rule>
<Obligations>
<Obligation ObligationId="fieldsAvailable" FulfillOn="Permit">
<AttributeAssignment AttributeId="...field1" DataType="...string">
/Record/content/socialStatus</ AttributeAssignment>
<AttributeAssignment AttributeId="...field2" DataType="...string">
/Record/content/probDesc</AttributeAssignment>
</Obligation></Obligations>
</Policy>
Figure 4.9: An example of XACML policy defined on the Rest Home Request record for the purpose
Healthcare Treatment.
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privacy safe and not approved by the Privacy Guarantor.
In the decentralised enforcement the privacy policies are applied by the data controller be-
fore the record leaves the local repository (i.e. Local Wrapper). This assures that only the
data that the requester is authorised to see will be delivered to it. This approach gives more
guarantees from the privacy point of view even if it requires a greater effort for the data con-
troller to apply the policies. In any case, the application of the privacy policies could be easily
encapsulated in the Local Wrapper module.
In both approaches privacy policies are defined (or chosen from the set of existing ones) by
the data producers and are stored on the Visibility Rule Manger that acts as the Policy Retrieval
Point. This assures that there exists a single and official place in which privacy policies are
maintained simplifying the definition and synchronisation among the parties.
In the current implementation we support only the “hiding” of certain fields but the approach
can be easily extended to more advanced privacy policies to mask or to encrypt certain fields
(e.g. the SSN). Filtering alone could allow curios consumers to guess the sensitive data from the
“missing” values. Consumers could be also able to combine two or more records to mine pro-
hibited information by exploiting data inferences that could arise [55]. Tackling these aspects is
a challenging task that requires further investigation in the definition of policies as it opens di-
verse research questions. Although we are currently working on automating the verification of
policy consistency to disallow information leakage [85], in the current system implementation
we provide only plain filtering policies. Given that the involved institutions are trusted parties,
and that in similar scenarios it is important to deliver the right amount of information [83, 94],
our solution has been validated by Privacy Guarantor confirming that it provides sufficient guar-
antees. In fact, it gives more guarantees than the IHE-XDS profile [93] and the projects that
have been based on it [136, 143] and applied worldwide for healthcare domain.
In conclusion, filtering policies in addition to the incremental protocol based on metadata
and records allows us to:
• Conceal sensitive information based on the data producer preferences with a tight control
on its distribution;
• Centralise only the metadata on the occurrence of events, that is not sensitive in our
context and can be stored in the event index with no violation of the privacy laws and
directives [94, 143] which disallow data duplication outside the boundaries of its data
controller;
• Tune and differentiate the distribution of metadata and records with an on/off access con-
trol for the first and a fine-grained and sub-document access control for the second;
• Manage selective subscriptions and access only to the events of interest minimising the
traffic;
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Next section report on the validation phases we performed together with the involved organisa-
tions in our case study.
4.5 Validation
Here we show how we validated both the process-oriented analysis approach and the system
prototype we developed and deployed to be used by the Province of Trento.
4.5.1 The Analysis Approach Validation
As described previously, we modelled the assistance processes and represented them graphi-
cally for a better understanding and involvement of stakeholders. In order to obtain a good
representation, the model should be very detailed to clarify any ambiguity. To achieve a de-
tailed and satisfactory modelling we performed more than twenty meetings with stakeholders.
The overall analysis approach is inspired by collaborative analysis and task oriented analysis
techniques [127, 173] that focus on tasks executed by operators. Other methodologies such as
ethnographic methodology [32] would require a bigger amount of time and resources to com-
plete the analysis. During each meeting at least two stakeholders were involved and each of
the four scenarios were analysed in case they were involved in them. This required investing
a considerable amount of time in a deeper analysis making the approach applicable only on a
restricted number of scenarios (four in our case). An example of resulting model is show in
Figure 4.10.
The formalism we adopted and the whole analysis process enabled us to:
• Discover, model and document only the relevant portions of business processes occurring
inside each institution and their inter-relationships and to understand the level of formality
of healthcare and socio-assistive processes. Given that each single actor has its own way to
operate inspired by best practices of their reference organisation or just by their common
sense and past experience, we tried to sketch out the glossary in use, the actions performed,
the responsibility (who does what), the exceptions and the constraints (e.g. what should be
done to proceed with the next step in another system), input and output data (i.e. events)
of an action. The final result should be models usable by non-technical people and by
analysts to gather system requirements;
• Capture the data flow and the data format (paper vs. electronic form) to understand how
information usually flows and the points of automation to transform paper-based data into
“informatised” knowledge that is more “usable”;
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Figure 4.10: Excerpt of artefacts used during the analysis phases to model actors, performed activities
and data.
• Isolate events and their contents (fields), domain values, point of generation and frequency
of generation, their type, optional or compulsory nature, standardised nomenclature and
domain attributes;
• Derive KPI to understand what the user (operators of the healthcare and socio-assistive
domain and governing bodies) needs and their expectations from the system.
This approach allowed us to tackle the time limitations and the necessity to cover as many
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cases as possible and to get a complete picture of the domain. In our analysis we modelled the
processes just to identify the events and the conditions for their generation. Indeed, in that way
we missed some details but at the same time we simplified the problem to make it tractable.
During the analysis we also tried to standardise the structure of events among different
data producers allowing their integration. This implies that the events need to speak the same
language, that is, to use a common and shared glossary (e.g. a shared nomenclature of social-
health services). We defined about 40 record types. There was no need to deal with the databases
at the sources that sometimes have more than hundred of tables, some having more than fifty
attributes.
The resulting modelled processes have many exceptions, for example they may start from
a social worker but also from the medical staff and each sub-process at the data controllers
can end at any point in time (e.g. for rejection of the request or death). To make things even
more complex the same information system could be used following a different sequence of
interactions.
Overall, even if we identified some limitations of the current approach, it gave us the appro-
priate tool to involve the stakeholders and complete successfully the analysis phase.
4.5.2 The System Validation
Once finished with the development we defined the deployment plan with the involved stake-
holders, which consisted into an on-field two-phase experimentation by:
1. Testing and evaluation of the system in a controlled environment (6 months);
2. Deployment into production to start the evolution from prototype to product at the Province
data centre (2 years).
At the time we are writing this thesis, the project is approaching the second year of the second
phase. The deployment plan has been defined together with the Province and the involved
institutions and refined on the basis of a first round of tests. It will verify if the system is
properly dimensioned with regard to the number, size and rate of production of the events (some
numbers are shown in Table 4.4), and the IT infrastructures available at the data controllers to
verify if they can interact with the platform.
Table 4.4 shows the number of event types that each involved institution is producing and
the estimated number of instances generated per year. The estimated required storage is also
shown in the last column.
To test the system in the first phase we defined some fictitious citizen profiles to execute a set
of complete request-evaluation-provisioning assistance processes in the data controllers sys-
tems to verify the correct production, routing and consumption of the events. We also computed
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Institution
Number of event
types
Estimated number of
event instances
Total event
dimension (MB)
Healthcare Agency 9 14500 56
Welfare Agency 14 74700 251
Local Municipality 7 53100 205
Tele-assistance 7 93985 322
Table 4.4: Estimation of the number of events and data exchanged annually.
a first set of KPIs on the DWH. Although the obtained KPIs from the artificial data were not re-
flecting the actual real world statistics, they allowed us to test the capability of the infrastructure
in feeding the BI module and the usefulness of the indicators identified.
The effort required to join the platform and to share information from the technological
point of view was very low since institutions had to implement only a couple of web service
invocations. This step nowadays can be performed in few minutes with automated functionali-
ties offered by newer IDEs (Eclipse, NetBeans etc.). We recall that the Local Wrapper that we
released to the data controllers, provides the business logic for data storage, requests resolution,
waiting for incoming messages and the security protocols. This was one of the key factors for
the project success as it minimised considerably the institutions’ effort in a scenario in which
high learning curve and entry barriers are a deterrent for smaller institutions.
The Visibility Rule Manager and the policies enabled the data producers (assisted by us) to
define fine-grained exchange rules over their data. In this way they had a complete control on
how and to whom the data will be delivered. This choice respects the main requirement that the
data provider is responsible for its own data treatment. The number of policies that a producer
will define for each event depends on the requests for subscription to that event. In our scenario
the BI module consumes the larger part of events, so the majority of events will have at least
one policy to regulate how to feed the DWH. However, there are events that will be consumed
by all parties for different purposes and this will imply the need for more policies.
4.6 Lessons Learned and Discussion
Cross-organisation healthcare projects are characterised by unique cultural settings, specific
regulations, national-wide and local trends and guidelines. Managing such projects (from anal-
ysis to testing phases) requires therefore each time a specific approach that considers the speci-
ficity of the contexts and that it is able to involve proactively the stakeholders during the project
phases. In Trentino, like in other Italian regions and European countries, the health and social
services are provided by different organisations having different interests. One of main critical
challenges that needs to be tackled, and that we noticed also in other projects, is about involving
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organisations that will be asked to spend time and resources for participating initially during the
analysis phase, and then, later, in adapting their systems to join the developed infrastructure.
The obligations towards the welfare agency for accounting or for providing statistical informa-
tion could not be sufficient as motivating factors for good engagement to the joint effort and
therefore, influencing the project success.
The case study we analyse had as the main objective the reporting, i.e. integrating data from
different institutions and generating information about identified KPIs. As such, it seemed to
be a classical data-warehousing problem, for which there are by now fairly consolidated tech-
niques. However, from the outset it turned out that our initial assumptions and hopes for a quick
solution using data warehousing techniques proved to be wrong, and the problem required con-
siderable research efforts to design a solution that is minimally invasive (from technical and
organisational perspective) and that provides strong privacy control. Namely, in such scenar-
ios, centralized integration approaches such as classical data-integration or centralised EHR
architectures [89] are not suitable and sometimes forbidden by law. In our case, even the de-
centralised architectures such as the IHE - XDS [93] that has been successfully applied in many
projects [136, 36] have been demonstrated as not suitable “as-is” for the integration of social
and health services. Non-standardised data and assistance processes require a deeper analysis
to identify the best trade-off between existing well-established standards and custom solutions
to tackle the specific requirements. To address these challenges, we successfully identified dif-
ferent research contributions relatively to the project management aspects (the analysis) and to
the applied technology (privacy-aware data-sharing protocol).
The proposed analysis approach that focuses on identifying the events generated during the
user-system interaction has been demonstrated to be an exhaustive solution for a complex cross-
organisation scenario. This analysis approach identifies which documents can be translated
into electronic records, while the internally generated events provide information about the
generated data content (list of fields, type, format). However, analysing and automating the
cross-organisation document exchanges should be only the first automation step. Starting from
it, the cross-organisation processes could be (and should be) further tuned and modified to
achieve better performances and better integration among different institutions.
The proposed concise and relatively easily understandable modelling formalism given by
the activity diagrams is able to actively involve domain experts to teach to system designers and
other domain experts their internal socio-health domain. This has been one of the key factors for
achieving a good analysis and therefore for projects success. The domain experts learned also
how to perform on their own the analysis of other scenarios and identify the events of interest.
The proposed privacy-preserving data sharing protocol minimises the effort for involved
institutions to join the platform and to achieve data sharing. The integration approach based on
events provides a content independent mechanism to share data, which does not depend on data
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sources’ technology and sources’ database schemas.
The sub-document filtering, in conjunction with the incremental protocol based on metadata
and records, provides the sufficiently flexible privacy-preserving techniques to tackle a context
that is characterized by several organisations producing and consuming different kinds of data.
The filtering policies enable the sharing of records containing socio-assistive, healthcare and
financial data without violating the purpose of use principle.
The choice of assigning to the data controllers the task of definition of data filtering policies
decentralizes the competences and responsibility. In such way the platform and the organization
that manage the platform at runtime, will not have any legal responsibility on the way data
is shared among institutions. This simplifies the task of project approval from the Privacy
Guarantor.
This approach assumes that data controllers will have the necessary knowledge to define
safe filtering policies that do not disclose sensitive information (e.g. forbid to curios consumer
to guess the sensitive data from the “missing” values or to combine two records to mine prohib-
ited information). This is a challenging task that requires further investigation in the definition
of policies as it opens diverse challenges. These challenges and our work on facilitating the
definition of policies and automatic verification of their safety and prevention of information
leakage is described in Section 5.
Overall the developed solution provides data-sharing and basic infrastructure for Business
Intelligence and Electronic Health and Social Record systems for social and health services. The
developed Business Intelligence service gives a global view on the cross-institutional socio-
medical processes while the integration approach and the supporting framework represent a
new interoperability reference model for institutions involved in health and social assistance.
An instance of the developed solution has been successfully applied in a project undertaken by
the Province of Trento, Italy.
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Access Control Policy Violation Prevention
Previous chapter describes an access control policy enforcement approach in which each data
source defines access control policies locally on its own data (or local schema). In such scenario,
however, data sources cannot anticipate data inferences that can arise when data is integrated
at the EHR level. Inferences, e.g., using functional dependencies, can allow malicious users to
obtain prohibited information by linking multiple queries and thus to violate the local policies.
In this chapter, we describe a framework, i.e., a methodology and a set of algorithms, to
prevent such violations. First we identify sets of queries, called violating transactions, that lead
to violations if combined based on functional dependencies and then we propose an approach
to forbid the execution of those transactions by identifying additional access control rules that
should be added to the EHR. We also state the complexity of the algorithms and discuss a set
of experiments we conducted by using both real and synthetic datasets. Tests also confirm the
complexity and upper bounds in worst-case scenarios of the proposed algorithms.
5.1 Introduction
Data integration offers a convenient way to query different data sources while using a unique
entry point (e.g. an EHR system) that is typically called mediator. Although this ability to
synthesize and combine information maximizes the answers provided to the user, some pri-
vacy issues could arise in such a scenario. The authorization policies governing the way data
is accessed are defined by each source at local level without taking into consideration data of
other sources. In relational and other systems, data constraints or hidden associations between
attributes at the mediator level could be used by a malicious user to retrieve prohibited infor-
mation. One type of such constraints are the functional dependencies (FDs). When FDs are
combined with authorized information, they may allow the disclosure of some prohibited in-
formation. In these cases, there is a need for providing additional mechanisms at the mediator
level to forbid the leakage of any prohibited information.
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In this work we aim at assisting administrators in identifying such faults and defining ad-
ditional access control rules at the mediator level to remedy the inference problem. Given a
(relational) schema of the mediator, the sources’ policies and a set of FDs, we propose a set
of algorithms that are able to identify violating transactions. These transactions correspond to
sets of queries that violate the sources’ policies if used in conjunction with FDs. To avoid the
completion of a transaction, and therefore the violation of any source’s policy, we propose a
query cancellation algorithm that identifies a minimum set of queries that need to be forbidden.
The identified set of queries is then used to generate additional rules to be added to the existing
set of rules of the mediator.
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides definitions of the
main (technical) concepts we use in the chapter. Section 5.3 introduces a motivating scenario,
the integration approach and challenges posed by functional dependencies. In Section 5.4 we
describe our methodology. Section 5.5 describes the detection phase that identifies the policy
violations. Section 5.6 describes the reconfiguration phase that deals with flaws identified in
the detection phase. Section 5.7 describes the experiments. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.8.
5.2 Preliminaries
Before describing our approach, a number of introductory definitions are needed:
Datalog rule. [1] A (datalog) rule is an expression of the form
R1(u1):−R2(u2), ..., Rn(un), where n ≥ 1, R1, ..., Rn are relation names and u1, ..., un are free
tuples of appropriate arities. Each variable occurring in u1 must also occur in at least one of
u2, ..., un.
Authorization policy. An authorization policy is a set of authorization rules. An authorization
rule is a view that describes the part of data that is prohibited to the user. An authorization rule
will be expressed using an augmented datalog rule. This augmentation consists in adding a set
of predicates characterizing the users to whom the authorization rule applies.
Violating Transaction. A violating transaction T is a set of queries such that if they are exe-
cuted and their results combined, they will lead to disclosure of sensitive information and thus
violating the authorization policy.
Functional Dependency. [107] A functional dependency over a schema R (or simply an FD)
is a statement of the form:
R : X → Y (or simply X → Y whenever R is understood from the context), where X , Y ⊆
schema(R). We refer to X as the left hand side (LHS) and Y as the right hand side (RHS) of
the functional dependency X → Y.
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A functional dependency R : X → Y is satisfied in a relation r over R, denoted by r
|= R : X → Y , iff ∀ t1, t2 ∈ r if t1[X] = t2[X], then t1[Y ] = t2[Y ].
Pseudo transitivity rule. [107] The pseudo transitivity rule is an inference rule that could be
derived from Armstrong rules [14]. This rule states that if X → Y and YW → Z then
XW → Z.
Without loss of generality we consider functional dependencies having only one attribute
in their RHS. A functional dependency of the form X → Y Z could always be replaced by
X → Y and X → Z by using the decomposition rule [107] which is defined as follows: if F `
X→ YZ, then F ` X→ Y and F ` X→ Z.
5.3 Motivating Scenario
We consider a healthcare scenario inspired by our work in Section 3 and 4 while developing the
infrastructure for Electronic Health Record (EHR) systems. The EHR in this case represents the
mediator which provides mechanisms to share data and to enforce the appropriate authorizations
and policies defined by data sources [104]. From that scenario we extract an example that
describes how FDs can impact access control and can be challenging to tackle at the mediator
level.
We describe the challenges in a Global as View Integration (GAV) scenario [106] but
the same challenges affect also the Service Oriented integration that we describe in Section
4. Namely, the sensitive information that is released through record requests can be joined, for
example, based on the patients’ social security number (SSN). In this way a requester can obtain
the same data as in the GAV approach by querying all the sources. This is the case for example
when data is collected to be used for Business Intelligence. In such case the data is stored in a
Data Warehouse that is described usually by a relational schema similarly to the GAV approach.
Here we define an example scenario with three sources. Particularly, we consider the sources
S1, S2 and S3 with the following local schemas: S1(SSN,Diagnosis,Doctor) contains the
patient social security number (SSN) together with the diagnosis and the doctor in charge of
her/him, S2(SSN,AdmissionT ) provides the patient admission timestamp, S3(SSN, Service)
provides the service to which a patient has been assigned.
The mediator virtual relation, according to the GAV integration approach, is defined by
using relations of the sources. We consider a single virtual relation to simplify the scenario but
the same reasoning applies for a mediator’s schema composed by a set of virtual relations. In
our example, the mediator will combine the data of the sources joined over the SSN attribute
as shown by rule (5.1).
93
5.3. MOTIVATING SCENARIO CHAPTER 5. ACCESS CONTROL FOR EHR
M(SSN,Diagnosis,Doctor, AdmissionT, Service) : −
S1(SSN,Diagnosis,Doctor), S2(SSN,AdmissionT ), S3(SSN, Service).
(5.1)
Authorization Policies are specified by each source on its local schema and propagated to
the mediator. In our example, we assume two categories of users: doctors and nurses. For S1,
doctors can access SSN and Diagnosis while nurses can access either SSN or Diagnosis
but not their association (i.e., simultaneously). The rule (5.2) expresses this policy in form of a
prohibition.
R1(SSN,Diagnosis) : −S1(SSN,Diagnosis), role = nurse. (5.2)
The other sources allow accessing to their content without restrictions both for doctors and
nurses, therefore there are no more authorization rules to specify.
At the Mediator, authorization rules are propagated by the sources aiming at preserving
their policies. The propagation can lead to policy inconsistencies and conflicts [57]. These
issues are out of the scope of this chapter. In our example there is only one rule defined by S1
to be propagated at the mediator.
We then assume that at the mediator the following FDs are identified, either manually during
the schema definition or by analyzing the data with algorithms such as TANE[91]:
(AdmissionT, Service)→ SSN (F1)
(AdmissionT,Doctor)→ Diagnosis (F2)
F1 holds because at each service there is only one patient that is admitted at a given time
AdmissionT . Note that AdmissionT represents the admission timestamp including hours,
minutes and seconds. F2 holds because at a given timestamp, a doctor could make only one
diagnosis.
Let see how FD could be used by a malicious user to violate the rule (5.2). Let us as-
sume the following queries are issued by a nurse: Q1(SSN,AdmissionT, Service) and then
Q2(Diagnosis, AdmissionT, Service). Combining the results of the two queries and using the
functional dependency F1, the nurse can obtain SSN andDiagnosis simultaneously, which in-
duces the violation of the authorization rule (5.2). To do so, the nurse could proceed as follows:
(a) join the result of Q1 with those of Q2 on the attributes AdmissionT and Service; (b) take
advantage of F1 to obtain the association between SSN and Diagnosis.
From now on, we refer to a query set like {Q1, Q2} as a violating transaction. Indeed,
both F1 and F2 do not hold in any source. They both use attributes provided by different
sources. Thus, the semantic constraints expressed by these functional dependencies could not
be considered by any source while defining its policy. This example highlights the limitation
of the naïve propagation of the policies of the sources to the mediator. In the next section, we
propose an intuitive approach for solving this problem.
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Figure 5.1: The proposed methodology to identify violating transactions and define additional rules.
5.4 Approach
We propose a methodology that aims at detecting all the possible violations that could occur at
the mediator level by first identifying all the violating transactions and then disallowing com-
pletion of such violating transactions.
Our approach relies on the following settings: we consider the relational model as the refer-
ence model, both user queries and datalog expressions denoting authorization rules (see Section
5.2) are conjunctive queries and the mediator is defined following the GAV (Global As a View)
data integration approach. This means that each virtual relation of the mediator is defined using
a conjunctive query over some relations of the sources.
Currently we do not consider other types of inferences or background, external or adversarial
knowledge that refer to the additional knowledge the user may have while querying a source of
information [117, 41]. These aspects are important but they are out of the scope of this thesis.
The proposed methodology, as shown in Figure 5.1, consists of a sequence of phases and
steps involving appropriate algorithms. It takes as input a set of functional dependencies (FD),
the policy (P) and the schema (S) of the mediator and applies the following phases:
1. Detection phase: aims at identifying all the violations that could occur usingFD. Each of
the resulting transactions represents a potential violation. Indeed, as shown previously, the
combination of all the queries of a single transaction induces an authorization violation.
This phase is performed by the following steps:
• Construction of a transition graph (G): this is done for each authorization rule by
using the set of provided functional dependencies (FD).
• Identification of the set of Minimal1Violating Transactions (VT ): it consists in iden-
tifying all the different paths between nodes in G to generate the set of minimal
violating transactions.
1The concept of minimality is detailed in Section 5.5.2.
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2. Reconfiguration phase: it proposes an approach to forbid the completion of each trans-
action in VT identified in the previous phase. By completion of a transaction we mean
issuing and evaluating all the queries of that transaction. A rule is violated only if the
entire transaction is completed. This phase modifies/repairs the authorization policy in
such a way that no VT could be completed.
5.5 Detection Phase
In the detection phase we enumerate all the violating transactions that could occur considering
the authorization rules as queries that need to be forbidden. The idea is to find all the trans-
actions (i.e., a set of queries) that could match the query corresponding to the authorization
rule.
5.5.1 Building the Transition Graph
The aim of the transition graph is to list all the queries that could be derived from an autho-
rization rule using functional dependencies. For each authorization rule we use FD to derive a
transition graph (G) as shown in Figure 5.2. To build G we resort to Algorithm 1 as follows:
1. Consider the set of attributes of an authorization rule as the initial node.
2. For each FD in FD that has the RHS attribute inside the current node (starting from the
root):
(a) Create a new node by replacing the RHS attribute of the node with the set of attributes
of the LHS of FD.
(b) Create an edge between the two nodes and label it with FQ (see Definition 5.5.2)
corresponding to the FD that has been used.
3. Apply the same process for the new node.
5.5.2 Identifying Violating Transactions
The set of minimal violating transactions (VT ) is constructed as follows. First a path between
the initial node (the node representing the authorization rule) and every other node is considered.
As shown in Figure 5.2, from this path a transaction (i.e., a set of queries) is constructed. Each
query that is used as a label on this path is added to the transaction. Finally, the query of the
final node of the path is also added to the transaction. This is done for all nodes and paths in G.
Before showing how minimality of the VT is ensured let us introduce the following definitions.
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Algorithm 1: BuildTransitionGraph (BuildG)
input : ri the rule ri ∈ P ,
FD the set of functional dependencies.
output: G(V,E) the transition graph
1 V := {v(ri)}; // create the root v with the attributes of ri
2 W := {v(ri)}; // add v also to a set W of vertexes to visit
3 forall the w ∈W do
4 W := W − {w};
5 forall the FD(LHS → RHS) ∈ FD do
6 if RHS ∈ w then // RHS is one attribute
7 x := w − {RHS}+ LHS; // create new vertex
8 if x /∈ V then
9 V := V + {x};
10 W := W + {x};
11 e := (w, x, LHS + {RHS}); // e is a new edge from w to x
with as transition the attributes LHS + {RHS}
12 if e /∈ E then // if not already in E add it
13 E := E + {e};
14 return G(V,E) ;
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Figure 5.2: Graph construction and violating transactions identifications.
Building a query from a functional dependency. Let F be a functional dependency. We de-
fine FQ as the query that projects on all the attributes that appear in F , either in the RHS or
in the LHS. For example, let R(A1, A2, A3, A4) be a relation and let F be the functional de-
pendency A1, A2 → A3 that holds on R. In this case FQ is the query that projects on all the
attributes that appear in F . FQ is the query FQ(A1, A2, A3):−R(A1, A2, A3, A4).
Minimal Query. A query Q is minimal if all its attributes are relevant, that is ∀Q′ ⊂ Q : Q′
cannot be used instead of Q in a violating transaction.
Minimal Violating Transaction. A violating transaction T (see Section 5.2) is minimal if: (a)
all its queries are minimal, and (b) all its queries are relevant i.e. ∀Q ∈ T : T r {Q} is not a
violating transaction.
To generate the minimal set of transactions (VT ) that is compliant with the definition ??, we
use the recursive Algorithm 2. The initial call to the algorithm is: VT := FindV T (G, root, ∅, ∅)
The example in Figure 5.2 contains three nodes Q1, Q2 and Q3 in addition to the initial node
R1. If we apply Algorithm 2, it will generate, for each node Qi, a transaction containing each
FQ on the path between R1 and Qi, and Qi itself. For example, to generate T3 that represents
the path between R1 and Q3, we start by adding each Fi on the path from R1 to Q3. Here,
F1 and F2 are translated into F
Q
1 and F
Q
2 respectively. Finally, we add Q3. Thus, we obtain
T3 = {FQ1 , FQ2 , Q3}. In the example the returned VT is: VT = {T1 = {Q1, FQ1 }, T2 =
{Q2, FQ2 }, T3 = {Q3, FQ1 , FQ2 }}. At this stage we emphasized the fact that FD could be com-
bined with authorized queries to obtain sensitive information. In our example, this issue is
illustrated by the fact that if all the queries of any transaction Ti are issued then the authoriza-
tion rule R1(SSN,Diagnosis) is violated. To cope with this problem and prohibit transaction
completion, we propose an approach that repairs the set of authorization rules with additional
rules in such a way that no violation could occur.
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Algorithm 2: FindViolatingTransactions (FindVT)
input : G(V,E) the transition graph, v current vertex, ct current path, VT current set of
transactions.
output: VT the set of minimal violating transactions.
1 foreach e ∈ outgoing edges of v do
2 t := ct + e.transition+ e.to ;
// e.transition is the set of attributes of the transition
while e.to is the destination node
3 if @k ∈ V T | k ⊆ t then //if t is minimal with respect to ∀k ∈ VT
4 VT := VT + {t} ;
5 forall the k ∈ VT do
6 if t ⊆ k then // if k is not minimal with respect to t
7 VT := VT − {k} ;
// reducing further V T
8 return FindV T (G, e.to, ct + e.transition,VT );
// recursive call with the v reached by e (e.to) by adding
the e.transition to the current V T
5.6 Reconfiguration phase
This phase aims at preventing a user from issuing all the queries of a violating transaction. If
a user could not complete the execution of all the queries of any violating transaction then no
violation could occur.
The reconfiguration phase revises the policy by adding new rules such that no violating
transaction could be completed. A naïve approach could be to deny one query for each transac-
tion. Although this naïve solution is safe from an access control point of view, it is not desired
from an availability point of view. To achieve a trade off between authorization enforcement
and availability, we investigate the problem of finding the minimal set of queries that denies at
least one query for each violating transaction. We refer to this problem as query cancellation
problem. We first formalize and characterize the complexity of the query cancellation problem
for one rule. Then, we discuss the case of a policy (i.e., a set of rules).
5.6.1 Problem formalization
Let VT = {T1, . . . , Tn} be a set of minimal violating transactions and let Q = {Q1, . . . , Qm}
be a set of queries such that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : Ti ∈ P(Q) r ∅. We define the following Query
Cancellation (QC) recognition (decision) problem as follows:
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• Instance: a set VT , a set Q and a positive integer k.
• Question: is there a subset Q ⊆ Q with |Q| ≤ k such that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : Ti rQ 6= Ti
? Here, |Q| denotes the cardinality of Q.
Algorithm 3: QueryCancellation
input : VT is the set of minimal violating transactions.
Q is the set of all the queries that appear in VT
output: S is the set of all solutions
1 forall the q ∈ Q do
2 if ∀t ∈ VT , t ∩ q 6= ∅ then
3 S := S ∪ q ;
4 return S ;
Thus, the optimization problem, which consists in finding the minimum number of queries
to be cancelled is called Minimum Query Cancellation (MQC).
5.6.2 Problem complexity
In this section, we show the NP-completeness of QC. We propose a reduction from the domi-
nation problem in split graphs [31]. In an undirected graph G = (V,E), where V is the node
(vertex) set and E is the edge set, each node dominates all nodes joined to it by an edge (neigh-
bors). Let D ⊆ V be a subset of nodes. D is a dominating set of G if D dominates all nodes of
V rD. The usual Dominating Set (DS)[31] decision problem is stated as follows:
• Instance: a graph G and a positive integer k.
• Question: does G admits a dominating set of size at most k ?
This problem has been proven to be NP-complete even for split graphs [31]. Recall that a
split graph is a graph whose set of nodes is partitioned into a clique C and an independent set
I . In other words, all nodes of C are joined by an edge and there is no edge between nodes of
I . Edges between nodes of C and nodes of I could be arbitrary.
Theorem 5.6.1. QC is NP-complete.
Proof. QC belongs to NP since checking if the deletion of a subset of queries affects all trans-
actions could be performed in polynomial time. Let G be a split graph such that C is the set of
nodes forming the clique and I is the set of nodes forming the independent set. We construct
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an instance QC of query cancellation problem from G as follows: Q = C, VT = I and each
transaction Ti is the set of queries that are joined to it by an edge in G. We then prove that G
admits a dominating set of size at most k if and only if QC admits a subset Q ⊆ Q of size at
most k such that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : Ti rQ 6= Ti.
Assume QC admits a subset Q ⊆ Q of size at most k such that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : Ti rQ 6=
Ti. Q is also a dominating set of G. In fact, all nodes of I are dominated since all the transactions
are affected by Q and all remaining nodes in the clique C are also dominated since they all are
connected with nodes of Q. Assume G admits a dominating set D of size at most k. Observe
that D could be transformed into a dominating set D′ of same size and having all its nodes in
C. To ensure this transformation it is sufficient to replace all nodes of D that are in I by any of
their neighbors in C. Note that the obtained set D′ is also a dominating set of G. The subset of
queries to be canceled is then computed by setting Q to D′.
Thus, we can deduce the following:
Corollary 5.6.2. MQC is NP-hard.
To generate the set of queries that need to be canceled we use Algorithm 3. It returns all the
(candidate) sets of queries that have a non-empty intersection with each violating transaction.
We can use different metrics to determine which set to choose. The first metric is the cardinality
of the smallest set. Other metrics could be defined by the administrator. Indeed, some queries
can be identified as more relevant to the application. In this case, the set of queries to be chosen
could be the one that does not contain any relevant query. The minimal set of queries MQ is
defined using one of the previous metrics. For each query Q in MQ a new authorization rule is
added to prevent from the evaluation of Q.
In our example, the QC algorithm will return three different candidate sets of solutions to be
added to P . These sets are: {r(Q1), r(FQ2 )}, {r(Q2), r(FQ1 )}, {r(FQ1 ), r(FQ2 )}. If we choose
the first candidate set then we will have P = {R1(SSN,Diagnosis),
R2(AdmT, Service,Diag.), R3(AdmT,Doctor,Diag.)}.
5.6.3 Generalization for a policy
Algorithm 4 deals with query cancellation for the whole policy. We denote by P the policy (i.e.,
the set of rules). We denote by NR the set of new rules that has been generated. The new policy
set (P) will be the union of P and NR (P = P ∪ NR). A new rule could generate other new
rules and so on until no rule is added. Let NS be the set of attributes of the mediator schema.
Since NS is finite then the maximum number Nr of rules that could be defined is also finite. Let
NP be the number of rules in P . Let n be the difference between Nr and NP . At each recursive
call of the algorithm either no rule has been generated or n decreases since Nr increases. Thus,
the algorithm terminates.
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Algorithm 4: GenerelizationForPolicy
input : P the set of authorization rules.
output: P augmented with new rules.
1 forall the ri ∈ P do
2 G := BuildG(ri);
3 VT := FindV T (G, root, ∅, ∅);
4 S := QueryCancellation(VT , Q); // Q is obtained listing VT
5 NR := ∅; // NR is the set of new rules
6 forall the q ∈ S do
7 NR := NR ∪ {r(q)}; // Generate a new authorization rule r from
q
8 if NR is not empty then
9 NR := GenerelizationForPolicy(NR);
10 P := P ∪NR;
11 return P ;
5.7 Validation
We have conducted a number of experiments on real and synthetic datasets to validate each of
the steps of our methodology. With synthetic datasets we generated particular configurations
(e.g. worst-case scenarios) while with the real datasets (downloaded from the UCI ML Repos-
itory [22]) we first extracted FD by using a well-known algorithm called TANE [91] and then
we run our algorithms with sets of rules having different number of attributes (from 2 to 10). We
also tested the algorithms on specific subsets of FD (i.e., 100 and 200 extracted from the Bank
dataset) that were not present in real datasets (Sub 1 and 2 in Table 5.7). The source code of
the algorithms is released under GPL v3 free software licence and is available at the following
address [86].
The reports about measures performed on each dataset shown in Table 5.7 are as follows:
1. Detection phase: FDl is the average number of attributes that appear in FD, |G(V)| is
the number of nodes and |G(E)| is the number of edges of the generated graph, BuildG is
the time in ms to build G, |VT | is the number of generated VT and FindV T is the time
in ms to construct VT .
2. Reconfiguration phase: |P ′| is the number of rules that need to be added to the policy in
order to forbid the completion of any transaction in VT .
For each of the tests reported in Table 5.7 we calculated the mean value for 100 different
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Dataset desc. Identified FD Performed experiments and results
Name |S| |FD| FDl |G(V)| |G(E)| BuildG |VT | FindV T |P ′|
Yeast 8 10 3.88 6 10 5 5 4 7
Chess 20 22 9.14 21 20 3 20 14 21
Breast W. 11 37 4.13 41 165 26 37 65 20
Abalone 8 44 3.79 87 835 60 17 42 23
Sub 1 17 100 4.41 217 1312 193 130 197 54
Sub 2 17 200 4.92 453 8152 1502 1737 16596 263
Bank 17 433 6.47 14788 879241 3826 9137 335607 513
Table 5.1: Features data sets together with results of the experiments.
executions generating rules with a number of attributes ranging from 2 to 10.
While Table 5.7 reports on the approach practicability on real datasets, the graphs in Figures
5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 show tests performed on synthetic datasets. Also in this case we run
multiple tests while varying parameters that are not subject to the evaluation. In particular,
Figure 5.3 shows the relation between the number of nodes and the cardinality of randomly
generated FD. We report different tests while varying the number of attributes at the mediator
schema. The tests show that by increasing the cardinality of FD, the number of nodes increases
very fast until, at a certain point, it starts slowing and approaching its upper bound as expected
theoretically. Figure 5.4 shows the relation between the number of nodes and the time needed
for building G with fixed attributes in the mediator schema. As we can see, the time to build
G increases proportionally with respect to the number of nodes. This is mainly because we
use binary trees to manage the nodes. The dots in figures represent single executions while the
line has been generated using the Spline algorithm [88]. Figure 5.5 reports the performances
on identifying VT from previously built graphs. The time grows proportionally with respect to
the number of transactions. With the discovered VT we extract the additional rules by applying
Algorithm 4 to forbid transaction completion. Figure 5.6 shows the relation between the number
of transactions and the number of additional rules that are extracted. In particular, at each cycle,
we pick as decision metric the new rule that appear more often in VT . We observe that the
more FDs are discovered the more rules need to be added. This is due to the fact that more FDs
induce more alternatives to policy violations.
The experiments show the practicability of our methodology on different datasets with dif-
ferent characteristics. The approach showed some limitation only when the cardinality of FD
becomes very large (e.g., greater than 1500 for a single relation) being not able to discover
transactions in an acceptable amount of time. We believe that this amount of FDs does not
represent a typical scenario. Nevertheless, we will further investigate such situations.
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5.8 Lessons Learned and Discussion
In this work we have investigated the problem of illicit inferences that result from combining
semantic constraints with authorized information showing that these inferences could lead to
policy violations. To deal with this issue, we proposed an approach to detect the possible
violating transactions. Each violating transaction expresses one way to violate an authorization
rule. Once the violating transactions are identified, we proposed an approach to repair the policy.
This approach aims at adding a minimal set of rules to the policy such that no transaction could
be completed. As one alternative to the approach we propose in this chapter, we are analysing
the possibility of forbidding queries at runtime in order to avoid VT completion.
As future work we will extend this approach to partial FDs (i.e., the FDs that do not hold in
all tuples but can lead to policy violations). We also plan to investigate other kinds of semantic
constraints such as inclusion dependencies and multivalued dependencies. Finally, we could
consider other integration approaches such as LAV and GLAV where same issues can arise.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this chapter we summarise the thesis contributions and we report the collected feedback and
lessons learned from testing the proposed approaches and developed technology. We conclude
with final remarks which report the overall lessons learned while working in the healthcare
sector.
6.1 Summary of Contributions
We report briefly for each of the three core chapters and for each of the analysed research
threads the identified challenges and contributions.
In Chapter 3 we focus on the analysis of regulatory compliance and organisations’ specific
requirements aiming at building a cross-organisation and cross-regulation medical record shar-
ing platform. We envision that the developed platform could be offered as a service to healthcare
organisations providing the necessary tools to simplify data management (storage and sharing).
Having this vision in mind, we start by showing how the combination of regulatory com-
pliance and organisations’ specific requirements represents a complex obstacle to every organ-
isation that deals with privacy sensitive data. We show how regulations and laws vary from
country to country by analysing regulatory contexts in Italy and UK.
To help organisations in identifying, defining and executing regulatory compliant data shar-
ing, we proposed a methodology and an execution environment to:
• Capture the sequence of steps that need to be carried out by organisations to define their
own security and privacy policies and data sharing processes to conform to high-level
regulatory compliance requirements;
• Identify a set of elements, IT components and actors that can be orchestrated by data
sharing processes to achieve compliant data sharing;
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• Provide an environment for the definition and execution of shared processes and policies
to support data, process and policy management.
The overall approach is based on a novel use and customisation of business processes to
model the internal business logic of data management operations. Processes serve as a vehicle
to achieve high customisation of operations and enable organisations to satisfy their privacy,
security and business requirements. CHINO executes in such way data owners’ processes and
policies when their data is accessed by other organisations. By doing so, while organisations
use the same set of interfaces to interact with CHINO, they can achieve regulatory compliance.
Furthermore, the business process based approach allows users to better understand and
share their understanding of compliance requirements, and to reason about process definition
and process improvements. The visual modelling of business process provides better visibil-
ity and transparency on security and privacy rules. This can help at improving the trust and
compliance among the participant organisations.
In Chapter 4 we show how we approached the analysis, design and development of a data
sharing protocol and system architecture that preserve privacy while exchanging data among or-
ganisations. We show how the proposed algorithms can be used for building Electronic Health
Record and a Business Intelligence system for monitoring social and healthcare assistance pro-
cesses. While Chapter 3 focuses on regulatory compliance, Chapter 4 focuses on developing
the underlying technology and privacy policies for sharing sensitive data.
We show that event-based reasoning can greatly simplify the analysis of the organisations’
IT systems, facilitating the identification of the data needs among the parties and speeding up
the system development. The data sharing protocol and the technology minimises the effort for
the institutions to join and use the platform and it grants them full control on the access and
distribution of their data.
We give to the institutions the possibility to define fine-grained policies and control the dis-
semination of data based on the purposes of use. The data sharing protocol limits the disclosure
of data by releasing less sensitive information (metadata) and only when needed, delivering
more sensitive data (records) that has been properly filtered.
An instance of the developed solution has been successfully applied in a project under-
taken by the Province of Trento, Italy. The integration approach and the supporting framework
represent a new interoperability reference model for institutions involved in health and social
assistance.
The contributions shown in Chapter 4 have been applied in Chapter 3 and in building the
CHINO platform providing the main components, the data sharing protocol and the concept of
using events to share data.
Chapter 5 analyses challenges related to the prevention of access control policies violations
in data integration scenarios. We show how defining access control policies in integration sce-
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narios such as the one described in Chapter 4, can be challenging due to the presence of illicit
inferences that result from combining semantic constraints (e.g. given by functional depen-
dencies) with authorised information. We analyse in particular how functional dependencies
can lead to policy violations. To deal with this issue, we proposed an approach to detect the
violations and to repair the set of policies defined by data sources by adding new policies.
These contributions, when incorporated in the technology proposed in Chapter 4 for the
definition of sub-document access control policies, can lead to safer privacy policies for EHR
systems. Next section describes how the contributions of this dissertation have been validated
and the limitations that have been identified.
6.2 Validations, Limitations and Future Work
We report the main validation phases by following their chronological order to better present to
the reader the maturity level of contributions, their adoption in practice and their limitations.
Our work on the threads covered by this thesis starts with what is described in Chapter 4 and
the development of a data sharing and integration platform for social and health assistance. The
research effort is part of an innovation and development project undertaken by the province of
Trento. The reported research contributions have been validated within the project with real cus-
tomers and stakeholders. The developed technology, after being revised by a development unit
of a participant company, is now gradually being adopted by institutions delivering care in the
Province of Trento. Overall, its design choices have been validated successfully demonstrating
their suitability for the considered scenario.
One aspect that needs to be further improved is about the access control policies defined
at sub-document level to control the disclosure of data. Namely, although the technology has
been successfully validated, as shown in Chapter 5, the policy definition strategy can reveal
weakness and bring to policy violations in case of presence of data dependencies. This issue
needs to be further analysed at runtime by applying the technology shown in Chapter 5. As
shown in Chapter 5, this is a challenging task since semantic constraints can be of different
types (e.g. functional, inclusion or multivalued dependencies). In our work we consider only
functional dependencies and therefore, the work needs to be extended by analysing if other types
of inferences can generate the same issues. Furthermore, inferences can also hold partially (i.e.
not holding in all tuples or records) and thus requiring the definition of acceptable thresholds
under which the inferences are not considered risky. Other challenges related to this aspect can
consist of identifying semantic constraints without full access rights to the whole database of
all data sources. In addition, database content changes over time so there is the need to identify
semantic constraints by starting from the initial phase in which there is no data and then at
runtime when the data is generated and changes.
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Therefore, tacking these challenges is extremely complex, which leads to the adoption of
approximate solutions to satisfy the typical constraints for industrial projects (e.g. time and
resources).
After validating the work described in Chapter 4 within the Italian regulatory context, we
analysed the HIPAA regulations and data sharing best practices in US, and we discovered that
the proposed solution was not suitable and it was requiring significant modifications to data
sharing protocol and policies. Starting from this observation, we analysed challenges related
to cross-regulation data sharing and built the CHINO platform. Overall the work collects ex-
periences and lessons learned while developing data management solutions in Italy and US (by
collaborating with a team from HP Labs in Palo Alto, US).
To test the CHINO methodology and technology validity, we performed different tests:
• The CHINO platform has been validated by integrating it with a popular medical record
system called OpenMRS and by defining data sharing processes and policies according to
Italian, UK and HIPAA regulations and best practices.
• The validity of internal components and the data sharing protocol suitability in healthcare
have been validated also within the contributions of the Chapter 4. Namely, they have
been developed and tested within the project described in Chapter 4 before starting the
CHINO development.
• The usability of the CHINO modelling framework and the ability of business analysts
and developers to model business processes to conform to regulatory policies, have been
validated with a group of nine business process experts.
• By involving privacy experts we verified that the proposed tools and features in CHINO
provide the guarantees and ability to satisfy current regulatory policies and best practices
under Italian legislation.
We are currently adopting the CHINO methodology and concepts of the CHINO technol-
ogy, to model and automate assistance processes in a socio-health scenario within an innovation
and development project that involves many public and private institutions and caregivers pro-
viding assistance to elders [49]. The adoption of the methodology in IT projects as an analysis
approach gave us some encouraging feedback and confirmations about its validity. The visual
modelling of data management aspects has been demonstrated as an intuitive tool to involve
stakeholders.
Although the CHINO technology has been validated successfully, the natural extension of
the work would be a cloud-based platform for medical record sharing offered to a global market.
It represents a challenging and promising deployment scenario, yet rare to identify in practice
and in projects on which it can be tested and validated with real users.
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6.3 Final Remarks
This thesis reports our research results and lessons learned while developing medical record
sharing in multi-organisation settings. The presented work is inspired by research questions
identified while working on industrial and research projects and the overall approach is driven
by pragmatism and the aim of applying the research outcomes in ongoing and future activities
and projects.
Some of the challenges we identified in such context are related to: regulations complex-
ity, many actors having different roles and accessing data for different purposes, existence of
variety of technical standards, technology that still requires research efforts, assistance process
complexity, mix of private and public institutions, organisations business interests being not
completely in line with data sharing, organisations focused on assistance instead of developing
IT infrastructure, and organisations having limited resources. For example, the presence of a
multitude of actors such as hospitals, social-assistance public and private providers, accounting
offices, personal doctors, and many more, makes the healthcare an everyday life scenario char-
acterised by extremely complex challenges related to privacy and access control over data (e.g.
as shown in Chapter 5).
The most important lesson learned while working in such context is that every IT project
needs to be approached differently. Namely, managing and developing integration and data
sharing solutions requires state-of-the-art project management methodology and technology,
but at the same time pragmatism. In such a scenario, sometimes the most efficient and state-of-
the-art solutions simply could not work due to the impact on current information systems used
by organisations or due to the required time and costs to deploy it. There is usually the need to
preserve the institutions business interests.
Therefore, given the specificity and the complexity of the healthcare sector a conclusion is
that context matters. As shown in Chapter 5, sometimes there can be issues which require
too much effort to be tackled and sometimes a perfectly safe technology from security and
privacy points of views do not (still) exists. Therefore, depending on the context, even not
completely privacy safe solutions can be appropriate and applicable and moreover, as it has
been the case with the scenario described in Chapter 4, the proposed technology can introduce
significant improvements to the national-wide architectures and protocols [93, 143]. Namely,
compared to our solutions, the proposed national-wide standards do not apply any fine-grained
access control at sub-document level to manage the disclosure of medical records. Instead, we
introduce stronger privacy guarantees at integration layer to deliver to data consumers only the
data they need to perform their tasks.
The market evolution toward software as a service and cloud-based models inspired our
work in Chapter 3 on building the CHINO platform. This delivery model could have high
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impact in situations where small agencies use information systems to provide a limited set
of services. In such situation lightweight and less intrusive solutions need to be proposed to
enable them to sustain the required effort and meet the requirements imposed by integration
solution. This is also important if we consider the high complexity of information systems used
by bigger institutions from which data need to be extracted. In such cases there is the need
to propose a lightweight integration approach that avoids analysing their internal system and
database structures. Although the potential deployment of CHINO in cloud-based environments
requires further analysis of other research issues such as security and scalability, it represents an
interesting possibility following the market trends and it represents one of the main directions
in which our future research activity should move towards.
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